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Knowledge Beyond Belief.

Joakim, Sahar.

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Knowledge Beyond Belief.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Knowledge Beyond Belief./
Author:	Joakim, Sahar.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2020,
Description:	86 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-12, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-12A.
Subject:	Epistemology. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=27961162
ISBN:	9798635232989

Knowledge Beyond Belief.
Joakim, Sahar.

Knowledge Beyond Belief. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2020 - 86 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-12, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Saint Louis University, 2020.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

A standard position in epistemology is that knowledge requires belief. This project challenges that. By my lights, belief can be irrelevant for knowledge. My dissertation broadens the limits of knowledge by arguing that knowledge is not a kind of belief. I do this through an argument that knowledge does not require belief in Chapter Three and then presenting a stronger thesis that knowledge does not entail belief in Chapter Four.Chapter Two outlines the big idea behind the project. I offer a map of the mind by tracing intentionality through types of mental attitudes and distinct propositional mental states, such as knowledge and belief. I explicate the concept of belief as a fundamentally psychological notion. Knowledge, on the other hand, is a fundamentally social notion. I offer ways in which it is plausible that knowledge is not a kind of belief.Chapter Three discusses cases in which an agent knows their creative (or practical) activity in virtue of intention (not belief). The act of creating involves bringing the world into conformity with the contents of one's mind through successfully manifesting intentions. We know the products of our creative activity. A mental attitude involving bringing the mind into conformity with the world is not what constitutes this knowledge, and belief is essentially an attitude with that description. So, belief is not a necessary condition for this kind of knowledge. I call it conative knowledge.In Chapter Four, I emphasize the fundamentally social function of knowledge. In epistemic communities, assertion is the means through which knowledge plays its social function. Epistemic norms of assertion are governed in part by the social status of speakers. Some agents serve as representatives of a field in which they are an active member with a particular social role. For speakers serving as representatives of their community, knowledge is the norm of assertion. It is not the case that for every speaker, apt assertions require belief. A representative can be uncriticizable for their assertion that p even if the representative does not believe that p. If knowledge is the epistemic norm of assertion for representatives, and apt assertions do not require belief, it follows that representatives can know without belief.

ISBN: 9798635232989Subjects--Topical Terms:

896969
Epistemology.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Assertion

Knowledge Beyond Belief.
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300 $a 86 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-12, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Greco, John.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Saint Louis University, 2020.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a A standard position in epistemology is that knowledge requires belief. This project challenges that. By my lights, belief can be irrelevant for knowledge. My dissertation broadens the limits of knowledge by arguing that knowledge is not a kind of belief. I do this through an argument that knowledge does not require belief in Chapter Three and then presenting a stronger thesis that knowledge does not entail belief in Chapter Four.Chapter Two outlines the big idea behind the project. I offer a map of the mind by tracing intentionality through types of mental attitudes and distinct propositional mental states, such as knowledge and belief. I explicate the concept of belief as a fundamentally psychological notion. Knowledge, on the other hand, is a fundamentally social notion. I offer ways in which it is plausible that knowledge is not a kind of belief.Chapter Three discusses cases in which an agent knows their creative (or practical) activity in virtue of intention (not belief). The act of creating involves bringing the world into conformity with the contents of one's mind through successfully manifesting intentions. We know the products of our creative activity. A mental attitude involving bringing the mind into conformity with the world is not what constitutes this knowledge, and belief is essentially an attitude with that description. So, belief is not a necessary condition for this kind of knowledge. I call it conative knowledge.In Chapter Four, I emphasize the fundamentally social function of knowledge. In epistemic communities, assertion is the means through which knowledge plays its social function. Epistemic norms of assertion are governed in part by the social status of speakers. Some agents serve as representatives of a field in which they are an active member with a particular social role. For speakers serving as representatives of their community, knowledge is the norm of assertion. It is not the case that for every speaker, apt assertions require belief. A representative can be uncriticizable for their assertion that p even if the representative does not believe that p. If knowledge is the epistemic norm of assertion for representatives, and apt assertions do not require belief, it follows that representatives can know without belief.
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653 $a Intention
653 $a Knowledge
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