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Financial Intermediaries and Monetar...

Wang, Zhan.

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Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Policy.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Policy./
Author:	Wang, Zhan.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2020,
Description:	93 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-04, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International82-04A.
Subject:	Finance. -
Online resource:	https://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=28087811
ISBN:	9798678140616

Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Policy.
Wang, Zhan.

Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Policy. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2020 - 93 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-04, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Mississippi, 2020.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation consists of two chapters about banks. Chapter 1 is based on Gorton and Pennacchi (1990). It first describes the model and economic implications of the Gorton andPennacchi (1990) analysis of a bank that they claim helps to overcome the lemons problem in financial markets with asymmetric information. Then it indicates a logical inconsistency in the Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) analysis of the bonds issued by the bank. Finally, it replaces the Walrasian market for these bonds with a Shapley-Shubik market to fix this glitch, and gives a new proof of Proposition 2 in Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), replacing their old proof. Chapter 2 introduces interest on reserves (IOR) into the Cooper and Ross (1998) model of a bank. There are two major types of bank problems in this model: the standard contract (SC) and the run-proof contract (RPC). It finds the solutions to both contracts. Then it investigates the influence of IOR on the bank's behavior. For contract (SC), the rise of IOR reduces the bank's capital investment. For contract (RPC), it's not certain how the rise of IOR influences the investment level. The results also show that paying IOR makes the bank prefer the run-proof contract, which leads tomore stability of the financial system.

ISBN: 9798678140616Subjects--Topical Terms:

542899
Finance.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Asymmetric nnformation

Financial Intermediaries and Monetary Policy.
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300 $a 93 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 82-04, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Conlon, John;Hendrickson, Joshua.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Mississippi, 2020.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a This dissertation consists of two chapters about banks. Chapter 1 is based on Gorton and Pennacchi (1990). It first describes the model and economic implications of the Gorton andPennacchi (1990) analysis of a bank that they claim helps to overcome the lemons problem in financial markets with asymmetric information. Then it indicates a logical inconsistency in the Gorton and Pennacchi (1990) analysis of the bonds issued by the bank. Finally, it replaces the Walrasian market for these bonds with a Shapley-Shubik market to fix this glitch, and gives a new proof of Proposition 2 in Gorton and Pennacchi (1990), replacing their old proof. Chapter 2 introduces interest on reserves (IOR) into the Cooper and Ross (1998) model of a bank. There are two major types of bank problems in this model: the standard contract (SC) and the run-proof contract (RPC). It finds the solutions to both contracts. Then it investigates the influence of IOR on the bank's behavior. For contract (SC), the rise of IOR reduces the bank's capital investment. For contract (RPC), it's not certain how the rise of IOR influences the investment level. The results also show that paying IOR makes the bank prefer the run-proof contract, which leads tomore stability of the financial system.
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