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Payment between Friends: Compensatio...

Blumberg, Seth Harris.

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Payment between Friends: Compensation and Signaling in an Altruistic Partnership.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Payment between Friends: Compensation and Signaling in an Altruistic Partnership./
Author:	Blumberg, Seth Harris.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
Description:	137 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-06, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-06A.
Subject:	Economics. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=27540286
ISBN:	9781392750636

Payment between Friends: Compensation and Signaling in an Altruistic Partnership.
Blumberg, Seth Harris.

Payment between Friends: Compensation and Signaling in an Altruistic Partnership. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 137 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-06, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Friends often help each other without direct compensation. This behavior seems to contravene a basic tenet of economics, that prices and payment help coordinate supply and demand, increasing welfare. If compensation is useful between strangers, why not between friends as well?I address this question by building a model of bilateral trade in a friendship, where the price must be specified ex ante, and use it to understand under which circumstances a price of zero is an equilibrium outcome. In the model, two people have altruistic preferences towards each other, but may also have incomplete information about each other's motives. While altruists are able to undertake some beneficial transactions even at a price of zero, they would still benefit from a more efficient price. In contrast to previous work, I find that choosing to forgo payment cannot arise from being altruistic, nor from wanting to signal one's altruism. The key driver of this result is that the benefit of an altruistic reputation is greater to a selfish person than to an altruistic one, so no separating equilibrium in a signaling game could be sustained in which only the altruistic type sets price to zero.Instead, I find that a separating equilibrium is possible where a price of zero signals a partner's trust in the other's altruism, though this result can only be sustained at extreme parameters. Overall, my model rules out altruism signaling as a fundamental reason for the lack of priced transactions between friends, but opens the possibility that this behavior could be driven by signaling of trust. I conclude by discussing alternative approaches to examining this widespread behavior.

ISBN: 9781392750636Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Compensation

Payment between Friends: Compensation and Signaling in an Altruistic Partnership.
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245 1 0 $a Payment between Friends: Compensation and Signaling in an Altruistic Partnership.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2019
300 $a 137 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-06, Section: A.
500 $a Advisor: Reny, Philip J.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2019.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a Friends often help each other without direct compensation. This behavior seems to contravene a basic tenet of economics, that prices and payment help coordinate supply and demand, increasing welfare. If compensation is useful between strangers, why not between friends as well?I address this question by building a model of bilateral trade in a friendship, where the price must be specified ex ante, and use it to understand under which circumstances a price of zero is an equilibrium outcome. In the model, two people have altruistic preferences towards each other, but may also have incomplete information about each other's motives. While altruists are able to undertake some beneficial transactions even at a price of zero, they would still benefit from a more efficient price. In contrast to previous work, I find that choosing to forgo payment cannot arise from being altruistic, nor from wanting to signal one's altruism. The key driver of this result is that the benefit of an altruistic reputation is greater to a selfish person than to an altruistic one, so no separating equilibrium in a signaling game could be sustained in which only the altruistic type sets price to zero.Instead, I find that a separating equilibrium is possible where a price of zero signals a partner's trust in the other's altruism, though this result can only be sustained at extreme parameters. Overall, my model rules out altruism signaling as a fundamental reason for the lack of priced transactions between friends, but opens the possibility that this behavior could be driven by signaling of trust. I conclude by discussing alternative approaches to examining this widespread behavior.
590 $a School code: 0330.
650 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
653 $a Compensation
653 $a Favors
653 $a Friends
653 $a Payment
653 $a Signaling
653 $a Theory
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690 $a 0511
710 2 $a The University of Chicago. $b Economics. $3 1672980
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 81-06A.
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