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Social Responsibility in Supply Netw...

Zhang, Han.

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Social Responsibility in Supply Networks.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Social Responsibility in Supply Networks./
Author:	Zhang, Han.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2020,
Description:	197 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-10, Section: B.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-10B.
Subject:	Business administration. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=27742761
ISBN:	9781658470773

Social Responsibility in Supply Networks.
Zhang, Han.

Social Responsibility in Supply Networks. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2020 - 197 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-10, Section: B.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2020.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

I study how the structure of supply networks interacts with efforts to make supply chains more socially responsible. One example concerns mineral mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that funds armed conflicts. Nonprofits and legislative bodies pressure manufacturers to trace and disclose their mineral sources. My first essay studies the decisions of manufacturers and smelters in the mineral supply network. We show the equilibrium depends on the total demand of "compliance-prone" manufacturers, who would comply if the prices of certified and noncertified metals were equal. Our results imply once penalties make sufficiently many manufacturers compliance-prone, certified metal may become so expensive that some compliance-prone manufacturers will not comply.Five companies established a common fund for auditing the mineral smelters. Since the list of smelters certified by the audits is public, companies have an incentive to free-ride. Despite this incentive the fund was a success and received subsequent contributions from dozens of other companies. My second essay studies why. We consider two factors: an early-stage alliance and status-seeking behavior. We model the funding initiative as a public goods game and test the results in laboratory experiments. Our experiments show that the invitation stage is key to high contribution and status-seeking behavior affects the forming of an alliance.My third essay studies a buyer auditing suppliers within a network to identify noncompliance. If a supplier fails an audit, the buyer must rectify the supplier or drop it (along with dependent suppliers). The network topology evolves as the buyer drops suppliers. We show the buyer should first audit and drop some suppliers, then either rectify all remaining ones, or proceed directly to production. When focusing on an upper tier, the buyer should always audit the least valuable unaudited supplier, yielding greater balance in the network structure. We establish the condition under which the buyer may truncate auditing ("hear no evil, see no evil").

ISBN: 9781658470773Subjects--Topical Terms:

3168311
Business administration.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Auditing

Social Responsibility in Supply Networks.
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020 $a 9781658470773
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100 1 $a Zhang, Han. $3 3347466
245 1 0 $a Social Responsibility in Supply Networks.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2020
300 $a 197 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-10, Section: B.
500 $a Advisor: Aydin, Goker;Parker, Rodney P.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2020.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a I study how the structure of supply networks interacts with efforts to make supply chains more socially responsible. One example concerns mineral mining in the Democratic Republic of the Congo that funds armed conflicts. Nonprofits and legislative bodies pressure manufacturers to trace and disclose their mineral sources. My first essay studies the decisions of manufacturers and smelters in the mineral supply network. We show the equilibrium depends on the total demand of "compliance-prone" manufacturers, who would comply if the prices of certified and noncertified metals were equal. Our results imply once penalties make sufficiently many manufacturers compliance-prone, certified metal may become so expensive that some compliance-prone manufacturers will not comply.Five companies established a common fund for auditing the mineral smelters. Since the list of smelters certified by the audits is public, companies have an incentive to free-ride. Despite this incentive the fund was a success and received subsequent contributions from dozens of other companies. My second essay studies why. We consider two factors: an early-stage alliance and status-seeking behavior. We model the funding initiative as a public goods game and test the results in laboratory experiments. Our experiments show that the invitation stage is key to high contribution and status-seeking behavior affects the forming of an alliance.My third essay studies a buyer auditing suppliers within a network to identify noncompliance. If a supplier fails an audit, the buyer must rectify the supplier or drop it (along with dependent suppliers). The network topology evolves as the buyer drops suppliers. We show the buyer should first audit and drop some suppliers, then either rectify all remaining ones, or proceed directly to production. When focusing on an upper tier, the buyer should always audit the least valuable unaudited supplier, yielding greater balance in the network structure. We establish the condition under which the buyer may truncate auditing ("hear no evil, see no evil").
590 $a School code: 0093.
650 4 $a Business administration. $3 3168311
650 4 $a Operations research. $3 547123
650 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
653 $a Auditing
653 $a Behavioral operations
653 $a Public goods games
653 $a Socially responsible operations
653 $a Supply networks
653 $a Supply risk
690 $a 0310
690 $a 0796
690 $a 0501
710 2 $a Indiana University. $b Business. $3 1019045
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 81-10B.
790 $a 0093
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2020
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=27742761