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Essays on Incentives, Moral Hazard a...

Schlockermann, Jakob.

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Essays on Incentives, Moral Hazard and Optimal Policy.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on Incentives, Moral Hazard and Optimal Policy./
Author:	Schlockermann, Jakob.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
Description:	157 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International79-12A.
Subject:	Economics. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10822950
ISBN:	9780438048850

Essays on Incentives, Moral Hazard and Optimal Policy.
Schlockermann, Jakob.

Essays on Incentives, Moral Hazard and Optimal Policy. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 157 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2018.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This collection of essays studies incentives and public policy in health care and labor markets. Chapter 1 investigates the causal effect of financial incentives on hospital discharge decisions. Making use of a kink in the German reimbursement system for hospitals, I employ a bunching design to tightly bound the effect of marginal pay on patients' length of stay around zero. I discuss how the contrast between my result and the previous evidence is explained by differences in the institutional setting. In Chapter 2, I provide new evidence which improves our understanding of provider as well as patient behavior in response to incentives in health care. In particular, I show that a well-known piece of evidence in favor of moral hazard on the patient side with respect to health insurance coverage is better interpreted as limited attention behavior by doctors. Chapter 3 turns towards labor markets. It studies the impacts of heterogeneity in earnings potential on the optimal design of unemployment insurance and estimates the newly relevant parameters empirically.

ISBN: 9780438048850Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.
Subjects--Index Terms:

Health economics

Essays on Incentives, Moral Hazard and Optimal Policy.
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100 1 $a Schlockermann, Jakob. $3 3542721
245 1 0 $a Essays on Incentives, Moral Hazard and Optimal Policy.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2018
300 $a 157 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 79-12, Section: A.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisor: Mas, Alexandre.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Princeton University, 2018.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a This collection of essays studies incentives and public policy in health care and labor markets. Chapter 1 investigates the causal effect of financial incentives on hospital discharge decisions. Making use of a kink in the German reimbursement system for hospitals, I employ a bunching design to tightly bound the effect of marginal pay on patients' length of stay around zero. I discuss how the contrast between my result and the previous evidence is explained by differences in the institutional setting. In Chapter 2, I provide new evidence which improves our understanding of provider as well as patient behavior in response to incentives in health care. In particular, I show that a well-known piece of evidence in favor of moral hazard on the patient side with respect to health insurance coverage is better interpreted as limited attention behavior by doctors. Chapter 3 turns towards labor markets. It studies the impacts of heterogeneity in earnings potential on the optimal design of unemployment insurance and estimates the newly relevant parameters empirically.
590 $a School code: 0181.
650 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
650 4 $a Labor economics. $3 642730
653 $a Health economics
653 $a Hospitals
653 $a Limited attention
653 $a Provider incentives
653 $a Public economics
653 $a Unemployment insurance
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0510
710 2 $a Princeton University. $b Economics. $3 2093738
773 0 $t Dissertations Abstracts International $g 79-12A.
790 $a 0181
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2018
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10822950