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Metaethical Constructivism and Adapt...

Engel, Laura.

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Metaethical Constructivism and Adaptive Preferences.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Metaethical Constructivism and Adaptive Preferences./
Author:	Engel, Laura.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2019,
Description:	319 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-03, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International81-03A.
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=22585368
ISBN:	9781085704564

Metaethical Constructivism and Adaptive Preferences.
Engel, Laura.

Metaethical Constructivism and Adaptive Preferences. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2019 - 319 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 81-03, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Binghamton, 2019.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This dissertation approaches what have been called "adaptive preferences" from a metaethical constructivist framework, namely a framework that assumes that value is ultimately the result of valuing. I argue that a Humean combined constructivist approach that disambiguates amongst adaptive responses is best able to address the concerns motivating adaptive preference theory and provide guidance for appropriate intervention. To that end, chapter one begins by reviewing the literature on adaptive preferences and the evolution of the term due to its application to development theory. I then discuss the debate regarding the relationship between adaptive preferences and autonomy. I argue that the concerns motivating both sides of the debate should be kept in mind when addressing adaptive preferences.Chapter two introduces metaethical constructivism and reviews several constructivist theories. I argue that Humean constructivists typically either focus on the social construction of moral values, or the individual construction of all normative values. I then introduce my Humean combined constructivist approach and argue that it is better able to account for our normative reality.Chapter three argues for distinguishing between adaptive choices, beliefs, desires, and values. The transformation of adaptive values can be particularly problematic on my account. In particular, value transformation may harm a person's agency, psychological well-being, and moral self-assessment.In chapter four I provide definitions of adaptive values, choices, beliefs, and desires that are consistent with my Humean combined constructivist account. I then argue that acknowledging the constructed nature of value allows development practitioners to avoid a variety of problematic assumptions and inappropriate intervention methods. I furthermore maintain that my constructivist account provides an appropriate balance between subjective well-being and universal human interests.The final chapter discusses how development intervention may be improved in light of a Humean combined constructivist approach to adaptive responses. I argue that acknowledging the social construction of some values provides practitioners with guidance regarding when intervention ought to be social or structural as opposed to individual. In addition, my approach suggests that development practitioners should measure the subjective well-being of intervention participants to determine whether participants' lives are improving according to their own lights.

ISBN: 9781085704564Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Metaethical Constructivism and Adaptive Preferences.
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520 $a This dissertation approaches what have been called "adaptive preferences" from a metaethical constructivist framework, namely a framework that assumes that value is ultimately the result of valuing. I argue that a Humean combined constructivist approach that disambiguates amongst adaptive responses is best able to address the concerns motivating adaptive preference theory and provide guidance for appropriate intervention. To that end, chapter one begins by reviewing the literature on adaptive preferences and the evolution of the term due to its application to development theory. I then discuss the debate regarding the relationship between adaptive preferences and autonomy. I argue that the concerns motivating both sides of the debate should be kept in mind when addressing adaptive preferences.Chapter two introduces metaethical constructivism and reviews several constructivist theories. I argue that Humean constructivists typically either focus on the social construction of moral values, or the individual construction of all normative values. I then introduce my Humean combined constructivist approach and argue that it is better able to account for our normative reality.Chapter three argues for distinguishing between adaptive choices, beliefs, desires, and values. The transformation of adaptive values can be particularly problematic on my account. In particular, value transformation may harm a person's agency, psychological well-being, and moral self-assessment.In chapter four I provide definitions of adaptive values, choices, beliefs, and desires that are consistent with my Humean combined constructivist account. I then argue that acknowledging the constructed nature of value allows development practitioners to avoid a variety of problematic assumptions and inappropriate intervention methods. I furthermore maintain that my constructivist account provides an appropriate balance between subjective well-being and universal human interests.The final chapter discusses how development intervention may be improved in light of a Humean combined constructivist approach to adaptive responses. I argue that acknowledging the social construction of some values provides practitioners with guidance regarding when intervention ought to be social or structural as opposed to individual. In addition, my approach suggests that development practitioners should measure the subjective well-being of intervention participants to determine whether participants' lives are improving according to their own lights.
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