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Truth and Reality.

Hong, Hao.

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Truth and Reality.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Truth and Reality./
Author:	Hong, Hao.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2018,
Description:	218 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-02, Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertations Abstracts International80-02A.
Subject:	Metaphysics. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10841144
ISBN:	9780438268562

Truth and Reality.
Hong, Hao.

Truth and Reality. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2018 - 218 p.

Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-02, Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2018.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

It is widely accepted that whether a proposition-an entity that represents something as being a certain way-is true or false is determined by what the world is like. A popular notion that has been used to philosophically elucidate this intuitive idea is truthmaking, which claims that a true proposition is made true by an entity or some entities in the world. The entity(-ies) that make(s) a proposition true is the truthmaker(s) of the proposition. Philosophers hold different views on the nature of truthmaking and thereby have developed different theories of truthmaking. For example, David Armstrong proposes a necessitation account of truthmaking: an entity makes a proposition true partly in virtue of being a necessitator for the truth of the proposition. Josh Parsons proposes a supervenience account of truthmaking: an entity makes a proposition true just in case the truth of the proposition supervenes on the intrinsic nature of the entity. Recently, with a surge of interest in metaphysical grounding, some philosophers propose grounding accounts of truthmaking and take truthmaking to be a case of metaphysical grounding. I argue that none of these theories of truthmaking is adequate. I then develop and defend a theory of truthmaking which I call "Truthmaking as Representational Resemblance." According to my theory, the truthmaking relation between an entity in the world and a proposition that is made true by the entity is a resemblance relation between an entity and the representational nature of a proposition; the representational nature of a proposition resembles an entity just in case a state-of-affairs type is represented by a proposition and is tokened by an entity. Therefore, a proposition is made true by an entity just in case the proposition represents a state-of-affairs type and this type is tokened by an entity in the world.

ISBN: 9780438268562Subjects--Topical Terms:

517082
Metaphysics.

Truth and Reality.
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100 1 $a Hong, Hao. $3 3436365
245 1 0 $a Truth and Reality.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2018
300 $a 218 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertations Abstracts International, Volume: 80-02, Section: A.
500 $a Publisher info.: Dissertation/Thesis.
500 $a Advisor: O'Connor, Timothy;Ludwig, Kirk.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2018.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a It is widely accepted that whether a proposition-an entity that represents something as being a certain way-is true or false is determined by what the world is like. A popular notion that has been used to philosophically elucidate this intuitive idea is truthmaking, which claims that a true proposition is made true by an entity or some entities in the world. The entity(-ies) that make(s) a proposition true is the truthmaker(s) of the proposition. Philosophers hold different views on the nature of truthmaking and thereby have developed different theories of truthmaking. For example, David Armstrong proposes a necessitation account of truthmaking: an entity makes a proposition true partly in virtue of being a necessitator for the truth of the proposition. Josh Parsons proposes a supervenience account of truthmaking: an entity makes a proposition true just in case the truth of the proposition supervenes on the intrinsic nature of the entity. Recently, with a surge of interest in metaphysical grounding, some philosophers propose grounding accounts of truthmaking and take truthmaking to be a case of metaphysical grounding. I argue that none of these theories of truthmaking is adequate. I then develop and defend a theory of truthmaking which I call "Truthmaking as Representational Resemblance." According to my theory, the truthmaking relation between an entity in the world and a proposition that is made true by the entity is a resemblance relation between an entity and the representational nature of a proposition; the representational nature of a proposition resembles an entity just in case a state-of-affairs type is represented by a proposition and is tokened by an entity. Therefore, a proposition is made true by an entity just in case the proposition represents a state-of-affairs type and this type is tokened by an entity in the world.
590 $a School code: 0093.
650 4 $a Metaphysics. $3 517082
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
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