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Legal conventionalism

Ramirez-Ludena, Lorena.

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Legal conventionalism

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Legal conventionalism/ edited by Lorena Ramirez-Ludena, Josep M. Vilajosana.
other author:	Ramirez-Ludena, Lorena.
Published:	Cham :Springer International Publishing : : 2019.,
Description:	vi, 198 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
[NT 15003449]:	Part 1 The Notion of Convention -- Pre-conventions. A Fragment of the Background -- Re-examining Deep Conventions: Practical Reason and Forward-Looking Agency -- Part II Conventions and The Rule of Recognition -- Conventions, Reasons, and the Law -- The Rule of Recognition as a Constitutive Convention -- Social Facts and Law: Why is the Rule of Recognition a Convention? -- Cooperative Conventions, Rule of Recognition and Institutional Practices -- On Identifying the Law and Its Supposed Conventional Foundations. A Set-Theory Approach -- Part III Conventions and Legal Interpretation -- Conventionalism Unchained and Sceptical. A Defence of a Quasi-Realist Account of Legal Statements Against Dworkin's Criticisms -- Conventionalism and the Causal Theory of Reference -- The Interpretation of Plans.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
Subject:	Law - Philosophy. -
Online resource:	https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-03571-6
ISBN:	9783030035716

Legal conventionalism
Legal conventionalism[electronic resource] /edited by Lorena Ramirez-Ludena, Josep M. Vilajosana. - Cham :Springer International Publishing :2019. - vi, 198 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - Law and philosophy library,v.1261572-4395 ;. - Law and philosophy library ;v.126..

Part 1 The Notion of Convention -- Pre-conventions. A Fragment of the Background -- Re-examining Deep Conventions: Practical Reason and Forward-Looking Agency -- Part II Conventions and The Rule of Recognition -- Conventions, Reasons, and the Law -- The Rule of Recognition as a Constitutive Convention -- Social Facts and Law: Why is the Rule of Recognition a Convention? -- Cooperative Conventions, Rule of Recognition and Institutional Practices -- On Identifying the Law and Its Supposed Conventional Foundations. A Set-Theory Approach -- Part III Conventions and Legal Interpretation -- Conventionalism Unchained and Sceptical. A Defence of a Quasi-Realist Account of Legal Statements Against Dworkin's Criticisms -- Conventionalism and the Causal Theory of Reference -- The Interpretation of Plans.

The concept of convention has been used in different fields and from different perspectives to account for important social phenomena, and the legal sphere is no exception. Rather, reflection on whether the legal phenomenon is based on a convention and, if so, what kind of convention is involved, has become a recurring issue in contemporary legal theory. In this book, some of the foremost specialists in the field make significant contributions to this debate. In the first part, the concept of convention is analysed. The second part reflects on whether the rule of recognition postulated by Hart can be understood as a convention and discusses its potential and limitations in order to explain the institutional and normative character of law. Lastly, the third part critically examines the relations between conventionalism and legal interpretation. Given the content and quality of the contributions, the book is of interest to those wanting to understand the current state of the art in legal conventionalism as well as those wanting to deepen their knowledge about these questions.

ISBN: 9783030035716

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-030-03571-6doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

525060
Law
--Philosophy.

LC Class. No.: K140 / .L443 2019

Dewey Class. No.: 340.1

Legal conventionalism
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245 0 0 $a Legal conventionalism $h [electronic resource] / $c edited by Lorena Ramirez-Ludena, Josep M. Vilajosana.
260 $a Cham : $b Springer International Publishing : $b Imprint: Springer, $c 2019.
300 $a vi, 198 p. : $b ill., digital ; $c 24 cm.
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505 0 $a Part 1 The Notion of Convention -- Pre-conventions. A Fragment of the Background -- Re-examining Deep Conventions: Practical Reason and Forward-Looking Agency -- Part II Conventions and The Rule of Recognition -- Conventions, Reasons, and the Law -- The Rule of Recognition as a Constitutive Convention -- Social Facts and Law: Why is the Rule of Recognition a Convention? -- Cooperative Conventions, Rule of Recognition and Institutional Practices -- On Identifying the Law and Its Supposed Conventional Foundations. A Set-Theory Approach -- Part III Conventions and Legal Interpretation -- Conventionalism Unchained and Sceptical. A Defence of a Quasi-Realist Account of Legal Statements Against Dworkin's Criticisms -- Conventionalism and the Causal Theory of Reference -- The Interpretation of Plans.
520 $a The concept of convention has been used in different fields and from different perspectives to account for important social phenomena, and the legal sphere is no exception. Rather, reflection on whether the legal phenomenon is based on a convention and, if so, what kind of convention is involved, has become a recurring issue in contemporary legal theory. In this book, some of the foremost specialists in the field make significant contributions to this debate. In the first part, the concept of convention is analysed. The second part reflects on whether the rule of recognition postulated by Hart can be understood as a convention and discusses its potential and limitations in order to explain the institutional and normative character of law. Lastly, the third part critically examines the relations between conventionalism and legal interpretation. Given the content and quality of the contributions, the book is of interest to those wanting to understand the current state of the art in legal conventionalism as well as those wanting to deepen their knowledge about these questions.
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