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Shareholder Rights and Non-Price Loa...

Han, Yunhui.

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Shareholder Rights and Non-Price Loan Contract Terms.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Shareholder Rights and Non-Price Loan Contract Terms./
作者:	Han, Yunhui.
出版者:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
面頁冊數:	49 p.
附註:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 57-02.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International57-02(E).
標題:	Banking. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10636067
ISBN:	9780355395853

Shareholder Rights and Non-Price Loan Contract Terms.
Han, Yunhui.

Shareholder Rights and Non-Price Loan Contract Terms. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 49 p.

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 57-02.

Thesis (M.Sc.)--University of Lethbridge (Canada), 2017.

This thesis analyzes the impact of shareholder rights on non-price loan contract terms. Using a large sample of syndicated loans borrowed by U.S. firms between 1991 and 2006, I find that stronger shareholder rights significantly enhance the stringency of loan contract design. The likelihood of having collateral significantly increases with the strength of shareholder rights. Loan maturity of firms with strongest shareholder rights is 13.1% shorter. The loan size of the same borrowing firms is 8.4% smaller. These results are robust to different proxies of shareholder rights and are robust to the instrumental variable approach controlling for simultaneous determination of loan contract terms, such as collateral and maturity. This study complements the existing literature on the impact of shareholder rights on loan pricing and has important implications for understanding the impact of companies' governance structure on loan contract design.

ISBN: 9780355395853Subjects--Topical Terms:

1557594
Banking.

Shareholder Rights and Non-Price Loan Contract Terms.
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