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Concepts in psychology: Towards a be...

Gonnerman, Chad.

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Concepts in psychology: Towards a better hybrid theory.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Concepts in psychology: Towards a better hybrid theory./
Author:	Gonnerman, Chad.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2013,
Description:	206 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-02(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International75-02A(E).
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3599178
ISBN:	9781303483349

Concepts in psychology: Towards a better hybrid theory.
Gonnerman, Chad.

Concepts in psychology: Towards a better hybrid theory. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2013 - 206 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-02(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2013.

Philosophers, psychologists, and linguists have long been interested in concepts construed along the lines of bodies of knowledge or information. One traditional question asked is `What is their structural nature?' Standard theories answer, "Concepts are definitions or prototypes or some such single structure." I argue that there is reason to worry that these theories are mistaken in light of empirical work suggesting that the typical mind is populated by multiple types of structures across most conceptual categories. Such work encourages us to return to basics and ask, "What are concepts (in cognitive psychology)?" I argue that the leading proposal currently on offer is defaultism, the view that concepts are default bodies of knowledge stored in long-term memory. I then criticize this proposal primarily on the grounds that it is problematically inexact, leaving unclear the hierarchical level on which concepts exist. In its place, I offer an alternative, one that opens up the possibility that most concepts are hybrids, or informational complex composed of multiple bodies of knowledge coming from distinct structural kinds. I end by highlighting some of the troubles that these theories, and supporting empirical work, create for those philosophical naturalists and experimental philosophers who are interested in using intuitions to analyze concepts construed along the lines of informational bodies.

ISBN: 9781303483349Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Concepts in psychology: Towards a better hybrid theory.
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245 1 0 $a Concepts in psychology: Towards a better hybrid theory.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2013
300 $a 206 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-02(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Jonathan M. Weinberg; Timothy O'Connor.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2013.
520 $a Philosophers, psychologists, and linguists have long been interested in concepts construed along the lines of bodies of knowledge or information. One traditional question asked is `What is their structural nature?' Standard theories answer, "Concepts are definitions or prototypes or some such single structure." I argue that there is reason to worry that these theories are mistaken in light of empirical work suggesting that the typical mind is populated by multiple types of structures across most conceptual categories. Such work encourages us to return to basics and ask, "What are concepts (in cognitive psychology)?" I argue that the leading proposal currently on offer is defaultism, the view that concepts are default bodies of knowledge stored in long-term memory. I then criticize this proposal primarily on the grounds that it is problematically inexact, leaving unclear the hierarchical level on which concepts exist. In its place, I offer an alternative, one that opens up the possibility that most concepts are hybrids, or informational complex composed of multiple bodies of knowledge coming from distinct structural kinds. I end by highlighting some of the troubles that these theories, and supporting empirical work, create for those philosophical naturalists and experimental philosophers who are interested in using intuitions to analyze concepts construed along the lines of informational bodies.
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