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Essays on Corporate Governance.

Choi, Wonseok.

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Essays on Corporate Governance.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays on Corporate Governance./
Author:	Choi, Wonseok.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2017,
Description:	97 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-02(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International79-02A(E).
Subject:	Finance. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10279988
ISBN:	9780355371734

Essays on Corporate Governance.
Choi, Wonseok.

Essays on Corporate Governance. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2017 - 97 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-02(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, 2017.

Corporate governance is one major research topic in financial economics. Studies in this area explore how much severe agency problems firms have and how to mitigate such agency problems to benefit the firms and their investors. In this dissertation, I investigate whether outside directors' dissention has a monitoring role. The first essay tests whether outside directors' dissention increases firm value through outside directors' monitoring role. The second essay examines outside directors' dissention on earnings management. I found supportive evidences that outside directors' dissention can increase firm value and reduce earnings management. Also, only aggressive dissentions can lead higher firm value and less earnings management. Consistent with prior studies, these findings suggest that outside directors play a monitoring role and mitigate agency problems. In addition, this dissertation not only provides supportive evidences but also overcomes major challenges in most of empirical studies in corporate governance. I use the sample representing outside directors' real voting activities, so a strong assumption that outside directors have any interest different from the one of managers and arbitrary definitions of directors' independence are not used in this dissertation.

ISBN: 9780355371734Subjects--Topical Terms:

542899
Finance.

Essays on Corporate Governance.
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300 $a 97 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 79-02(E), Section: A.
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502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Texas Rio Grande Valley, 2017.
520 $a Corporate governance is one major research topic in financial economics. Studies in this area explore how much severe agency problems firms have and how to mitigate such agency problems to benefit the firms and their investors. In this dissertation, I investigate whether outside directors' dissention has a monitoring role. The first essay tests whether outside directors' dissention increases firm value through outside directors' monitoring role. The second essay examines outside directors' dissention on earnings management. I found supportive evidences that outside directors' dissention can increase firm value and reduce earnings management. Also, only aggressive dissentions can lead higher firm value and less earnings management. Consistent with prior studies, these findings suggest that outside directors play a monitoring role and mitigate agency problems. In addition, this dissertation not only provides supportive evidences but also overcomes major challenges in most of empirical studies in corporate governance. I use the sample representing outside directors' real voting activities, so a strong assumption that outside directors have any interest different from the one of managers and arbitrary definitions of directors' independence are not used in this dissertation.
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