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The moral economy : = why good incen...

Bowles, Samuel.

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The moral economy : = why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	The moral economy :/ Samuel Bowles.
其他題名:	why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens /
其他題名:	Why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens.
作者:	Bowles, Samuel.
出版者:	New Haven ;Yale University Press, : 2016.,
面頁冊數:	xvi, 272 p. :ill. ;21 cm.
附註:	Parts of this book were given as the Castle Lectures in Yale's Program in Ethics, Politics, and Economics, delivered by Samuel Bowles at Yale University in 2010.
標題:	Economics - Moral and ethical aspects. -
ISBN:	9780300230512 (pbk.) :

The moral economy : = why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens /
Bowles, Samuel.

The moral economy :why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens /Why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens.Samuel Bowles. - New Haven ;Yale University Press,2016. - xvi, 272 p. :ill. ;21 cm. - The castle lectures in ethics, politics, and economics..

Parts of this book were given as the Castle Lectures in Yale's Program in Ethics, Politics, and Economics, delivered by Samuel Bowles at Yale University in 2010.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 245-266) and index.

The problem with homo economicus --

Should the idea of economic man-the amoral and self-interested Homo economicus-determine how we expect people to respond to monetary rewards, punishments, and other incentives? Samuel Bowles answers with a resounding "no." Policies that follow from this paradigm, he shows, may "crowd out" ethical and generous motives and thus backfire. But incentives per se are not really the culprit. Bowles shows that crowding out occurs when the message conveyed by fines and rewards is that self-interest is expected, that the employer thinks the workforce is lazy, or that the citizen cannot otherwise be trusted to contribute to the public good. Using historical and recent case studies as well as behavioral experiments, Bowles shows how well-designed incentives can crowd in the civic motives on which good governance depends.

ISBN: 9780300230512 (pbk.) :US20.00

LCCN: 2015956890Subjects--Topical Terms:

576245
Economics
--Moral and ethical aspects.

LC Class. No.: HB72 / .B683 2016

Dewey Class. No.: 330

The moral economy : = why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens /
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504 $a Includes bibliographical references (p. 245-266) and index.
505 0 0 $t The problem with homo economicus -- $t A constitution for knaves -- $t Moral sentiments and material interests -- $t Incentives as information -- $t A liberal civic culture -- $t The legislator's dilemma -- $t A mandate for Aristotle's legislator.
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