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Economic signals = prize promotions,...

Tamura, Masaoki.

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Economic signals = prize promotions, anonymous giving, and political advertisements /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Economic signals/ by Masaoki Tamura.
Reminder of title:	prize promotions, anonymous giving, and political advertisements /
Author:	Tamura, Masaoki.
Published:	Singapore :Springer Singapore : : 2018.,
Description:	ix, 50 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
[NT 15003449]:	1 Tools Used in this Book -- 2 Prize Promotions for Solving Firms' Time Inconsistency -- 3 Giving and Anonymous Giving for Signaling -- 4 A Signaling Explanation for Political Parties and Advertisements.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
Subject:	Industrial organization (Economic theory) - Mathematical models. -
Online resource:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-981-10-8938-1
ISBN:	9789811089381

Economic signals = prize promotions, anonymous giving, and political advertisements /
Tamura, Masaoki.

Economic signalsprize promotions, anonymous giving, and political advertisements /[electronic resource] :by Masaoki Tamura. - Singapore :Springer Singapore :2018. - ix, 50 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - SpringerBriefs in economics,2191-5504. - SpringerBriefs in economics..

1 Tools Used in this Book -- 2 Prize Promotions for Solving Firms' Time Inconsistency -- 3 Giving and Anonymous Giving for Signaling -- 4 A Signaling Explanation for Political Parties and Advertisements.

This Brief sheds new light on three specific aspects of economic behavior - companies offering prize promotions, individuals making anonymous donations, and politicians creating political advertisements. These are considered signals that firms send to consumers, donors send to others, and politicians send to voters, respectively. The author shows why firms, donors, and politicians employ these behaviors, and what their social consequences are from an economic theory perspective. This book is intended for readers who are interested in industrial organization, the economics of giving, and political economics. Each topic can be seen as an application of simple economic theory to an unusual subject matter in economics. Thus, for students, this work also offers an introduction to analytical methods in time-inconsistency and involving asymmetric information. The problems and economic settings behind these topics are firms' time-inconsistency in a monopoly, asymmetric information in individual altruism, and asymmetric information regarding types of politicians.

ISBN: 9789811089381

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-981-10-8938-1doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

2091664
Industrial organization (Economic theory)
--Mathematical models.

LC Class. No.: HD2326 / .T368 2018

Dewey Class. No.: 338.6

Economic signals = prize promotions, anonymous giving, and political advertisements /
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520 $a This Brief sheds new light on three specific aspects of economic behavior - companies offering prize promotions, individuals making anonymous donations, and politicians creating political advertisements. These are considered signals that firms send to consumers, donors send to others, and politicians send to voters, respectively. The author shows why firms, donors, and politicians employ these behaviors, and what their social consequences are from an economic theory perspective. This book is intended for readers who are interested in industrial organization, the economics of giving, and political economics. Each topic can be seen as an application of simple economic theory to an unusual subject matter in economics. Thus, for students, this work also offers an introduction to analytical methods in time-inconsistency and involving asymmetric information. The problems and economic settings behind these topics are firms' time-inconsistency in a monopoly, asymmetric information in individual altruism, and asymmetric information regarding types of politicians.
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