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Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: ...

Perrault, Louis Morand.

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Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: Working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: Working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty./
Author:	Perrault, Louis Morand.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2016,
Description:	196 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-01(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International78-01A(E).
Subject:	Economic theory. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10155213
ISBN:	9781369102987

Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: Working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty.
Perrault, Louis Morand.

Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: Working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2016 - 196 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-01(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Queen's University (Canada), 2016.

This thesis investigates the design of optimal tax systems in dynamic environments. The first essay characterizes the optimal tax system where wages depend on stochastic shocks and work experience. In addition to redistributive and efficiency motives, the taxation of inexperienced workers depends on a second-best requirement that encourages work experience, a social insurance motive and incentive effects. Calibrations using U.S. data yield higher expected optimal marginal income tax rates for experienced workers for most of the inexperienced workers. They confirm that the average marginal income tax rate increases (decreases) with age when shocks and work experience are substitutes (complements). Finally, more variability in experienced workers' earnings prospects leads to increasing tax rates since income taxation acts as a social insurance mechanism.

ISBN: 9781369102987Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: Working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty.
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100 1 $a Perrault, Louis Morand. $3 3286987
245 1 0 $a Essays in dynamic optimal taxation: Working experience, unemployment scarring and poverty.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2016
300 $a 196 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-01(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Robin W. Boadway.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Queen's University (Canada), 2016.
520 $a This thesis investigates the design of optimal tax systems in dynamic environments. The first essay characterizes the optimal tax system where wages depend on stochastic shocks and work experience. In addition to redistributive and efficiency motives, the taxation of inexperienced workers depends on a second-best requirement that encourages work experience, a social insurance motive and incentive effects. Calibrations using U.S. data yield higher expected optimal marginal income tax rates for experienced workers for most of the inexperienced workers. They confirm that the average marginal income tax rate increases (decreases) with age when shocks and work experience are substitutes (complements). Finally, more variability in experienced workers' earnings prospects leads to increasing tax rates since income taxation acts as a social insurance mechanism.
520 $a In the second essay, the properties of an optimal tax system are investigated in a dynamic private information economy where labor market frictions create unemployment that destroys workers' human capital. A two-skill type model is considered where wages and employment are endogenous. I find that the optimal tax system distorts the first-period wages of all workers below their efficient levels which leads to more employment. The standard no-distortion- at-the-top result no longer holds due to the combination of private information and the destruction of human capital. I show this result analytically under the Maximin social welfare function and confirm it numerically for a general social welfare function. I also investigate the use of a training program and job creation subsidies.
520 $a The final essay analyzes the optimal linear tax system when there is a population of individuals whose perceptions of savings are linked to their disposable income and their family background through family cultural transmission. Aside from the standard equity/efficiency trade-off, taxes account for the endogeneity of perceptions through two channels. First, taxing labor decreases income, which decreases the perception of savings through time. Second, taxation on savings corrects for the misperceptions of workers and thus savings and labor decisions. Numerical simulations confirm that behavioral issues push labor income taxes upward to finance saving subsidies. Government transfers to individuals are also decreased to finance those same subsidies.
590 $a School code: 0283.
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
650 4 $a Labor economics. $3 642730
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0510
710 2 $a Queen's University (Canada). $3 1017786
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 78-01A(E).
790 $a 0283
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2016
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10155213