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Incentive payment systems and work e...

Li, Binsheng.

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Incentive payment systems and work effort in Chinese state enterprises.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Incentive payment systems and work effort in Chinese state enterprises./
Author:	Li, Binsheng.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 1992,
Description:	293 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 53-08, Section: A, page: 2927.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International53-08A.
Subject:	Labor economics. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9300330

Incentive payment systems and work effort in Chinese state enterprises.
Li, Binsheng.

Incentive payment systems and work effort in Chinese state enterprises. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 1992 - 293 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 53-08, Section: A, page: 2927.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Hawai'i at Manoa, 1992.

Egalitarianism was basic feature of the payment system adopted by Chinese state enterprises before the economic reforms. Because workers' incomes were virtually independent of their performances, their enthusiasm for working was seriously dampened.Subjects--Topical Terms:

642730
Labor economics.

Incentive payment systems and work effort in Chinese state enterprises.
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100 1 $a Li, Binsheng. $3 3285162
245 1 0 $a Incentive payment systems and work effort in Chinese state enterprises.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 1992
300 $a 293 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 53-08, Section: A, page: 2927.
500 $a Chairperson: Calla Wiemer.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Hawai'i at Manoa, 1992.
520 $a Egalitarianism was basic feature of the payment system adopted by Chinese state enterprises before the economic reforms. Because workers' incomes were virtually independent of their performances, their enthusiasm for working was seriously dampened.
520 $a Since 1978, a series of wage reforms have been conducted to link workers' payments with their performances. These reforms stimulated work incentives, but failed to achieve their full potential and caused some other problems. In the profit sharing system, when compensation is based on individual performance, the marginal return of work effort is shared by the state and the worker, while the marginal cost of work effort is borne by the worker, so the optimal work effort is below the socially optimal work effort. When compensation is based on collective performance, if transaction costs are high, non-cooperative workers may behave like free-riders, which undermines the effectiveness of the incentive system. This system also has a horizontal equity problem, and it is less able to offset risk. While compensating workers according to their disutility of work effort may solve some of the problems above, its effectiveness is undermined by the formation of worker-worker and/or worker-supervisor coalitions and is limited by the measurability of individual work effort. This study puts the profit sharing system and three alternative incentive systems into perspective within a principal-agent framework, analyses their problems, and points out some directions for improvement.
520 $a Empirical tests of the effects of fixed wage, profit sharing, and bonus on value added and profit (both serve as proxies of work effort) are conducted using cross-sectional enterprise data. The following results are generated: (i) work effort is independent of fixed wages; (ii) work effort is positively related to bonuses, the effect of bonuses is, however, decreasing over time; and (iii) work effort is also positively related to profit sharing; and the effect of profit sharing on work effort is smaller than that of bonuses.
590 $a School code: 0085.
650 4 $a Labor economics. $3 642730
650 4 $a Management. $3 516664
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710 2 $a University of Hawai'i at Manoa. $3 1017511
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 53-08A.
790 $a 0085
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 1992
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9300330