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Rationality and Expected Utility.

Gee, Maxwell.

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Rationality and Expected Utility.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Rationality and Expected Utility./
Author:	Gee, Maxwell.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2015,
Description:	213 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-03(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-03A(E).
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3733384
ISBN:	9781339216591

Rationality and Expected Utility.
Gee, Maxwell.

Rationality and Expected Utility. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2015 - 213 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-03(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2015.

We commonly make a distinction between what we simply tend to do and what we would have done had we undergone an ideal reasoning process --- or, in other words, what we would have done if we were perfectly rational. Formal decision theories, like Expected Utility Theory or Risk-Weighted Expected Utility Theory, have been used to model the considerations that govern rational behavior.

ISBN: 9781339216591Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Rationality and Expected Utility.
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100 1 $a Gee, Maxwell. $3 3281382
245 1 0 $a Rationality and Expected Utility.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2015
300 $a 213 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-03(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Niko Kolodny; Lara Buchak.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2015.
520 $a We commonly make a distinction between what we simply tend to do and what we would have done had we undergone an ideal reasoning process --- or, in other words, what we would have done if we were perfectly rational. Formal decision theories, like Expected Utility Theory or Risk-Weighted Expected Utility Theory, have been used to model the considerations that govern rational behavior.
520 $a But questions arise when we try to articulate what this kind of modeling amounts to. Firstly, it is not clear how the components of the formal model correspond to real-world psychological or physical facts that ground judgments about what we ought to do. Secondly, there is a great deal of debate surrounding what an accurate model of rationality would look like. Theorists disagree about how much flexibility a rational agent has in weighing the risk of a loss against the value of potential gains, for example.
520 $a The goal of this project is to provide an interpretation of Expected Utility Theory whereby it explicates or represents the pressure that fundamentally governs how human agents ought to behave. That means both articulating how the components of the formal model correspond to real-world facts, and defending Expected Utility Theory against alternative formal models of rationality.
590 $a School code: 0028.
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
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710 2 $a University of California, Berkeley. $b Philosophy. $3 1683966
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 77-03A(E).
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856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3733384