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Collision and collusion: Testing the...

Kashaev, Nail.

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Collision and collusion: Testing the Nash behavior in entry games of complete information.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Collision and collusion: Testing the Nash behavior in entry games of complete information./
Author:	Kashaev, Nail.
Published:	Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, : 2016,
Description:	119 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-04(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International78-04A(E).
Subject:	Economics. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10297026
ISBN:	9781369403824

Collision and collusion: Testing the Nash behavior in entry games of complete information.
Kashaev, Nail.

Collision and collusion: Testing the Nash behavior in entry games of complete information. - Ann Arbor : ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, 2016 - 119 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-04(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Pennsylvania State University, 2016.

The present dissertation consists of three essays on Econometrics of discrete outcome models. The first essay analyses possibility of discriminating between several solution concepts in a general class of semiparametric finite games with complete information based on observed data on outcomes and characteristics of agents. I find conditions under which it is possible to identify whether actual behavior of agents is consistent with a given solution concept. I propose different applications for my general methodology. For example, I can identify whether and how often firms play Nash equilibria (NE) in an entry game, which equilibria are more likely to be selected, and whether profit functions are private information or common knowledge. I also identify whether choices are sequential or simultaneous.

ISBN: 9781369403824Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.

Collision and collusion: Testing the Nash behavior in entry games of complete information.
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100 1 $a Kashaev, Nail. $3 3279193
245 1 0 $a Collision and collusion: Testing the Nash behavior in entry games of complete information.
260 1 $a Ann Arbor : $b ProQuest Dissertations & Theses, $c 2016
300 $a 119 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 78-04(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Joris Pinkse; Sung Jae Jun.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Pennsylvania State University, 2016.
520 $a The present dissertation consists of three essays on Econometrics of discrete outcome models. The first essay analyses possibility of discriminating between several solution concepts in a general class of semiparametric finite games with complete information based on observed data on outcomes and characteristics of agents. I find conditions under which it is possible to identify whether actual behavior of agents is consistent with a given solution concept. I propose different applications for my general methodology. For example, I can identify whether and how often firms play Nash equilibria (NE) in an entry game, which equilibria are more likely to be selected, and whether profit functions are private information or common knowledge. I also identify whether choices are sequential or simultaneous.
520 $a The second essay is a logical continuation of the first one. I focus on entry games with complete information and provide a statistical tool to test for the NE solution concept. I develop a sieve likelihood ratio type procedure to test whether the NE assumption can rationalize the data on outcomes and payoff shifters in semiparametric entry games with second-order rational firms. I allow agents to play mixed strategy NE in the regions of NE multiplicity. I do not impose parametric restrictions on the way firms randomize between different equilibria. The testing procedure does not assume that the model is point identified. I apply the proposed procedure to the data on entry and exit decisions of small grocery stores in rural areas in the USA.
520 $a In the third essay I address the issue of data availability in parametric binary outcome models. In particular, I consider environments where the researcher only observes the data that correspond to a particular outcome (pure choice-based data) and has some auxiliary information about the distribution of the explanatory variables. I propose a Generalized Method of Moments type procedure to estimate parametric binary models with pure choice-based data when auxiliary information on distribution of explanatory variables is available. As an empirical application of my procedure, I estimate the probability of a two-car collision based on the data on all police reported accidents in Seattle from 2002-2011.
590 $a School code: 0176.
650 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
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710 2 $a The Pennsylvania State University. $3 699896
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 78-04A(E).
790 $a 0176
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2016
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10297026