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A Defense of Reductive Physicalism.

Dosanjh, Ranpal Singh.

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A Defense of Reductive Physicalism.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	A Defense of Reductive Physicalism./
Author:	Dosanjh, Ranpal Singh.
Description:	127 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-08(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-08A(E).
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3686843
ISBN:	9781321638028

A Defense of Reductive Physicalism.
Dosanjh, Ranpal Singh.

A Defense of Reductive Physicalism. - 127 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-08(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto (Canada), 2014.

In this dissertation, I defend reductive physicalism, according to which (in particular) mental properties are type-identical to physical properties. I use a burden of proof strategy to defend the position, established by appealing to scientific practice, methodological considerations, and analogies between higher-level properties and paradigm cases of reduction. This strategy allows various non-reductive and anti-physicalist positions to be explored in the context of arguments presented in their favour.

ISBN: 9781321638028Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

A Defense of Reductive Physicalism.
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100 1 $a Dosanjh, Ranpal Singh. $3 3189725
245 1 2 $a A Defense of Reductive Physicalism.
300 $a 127 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-08(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Jessica M. Wilson.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Toronto (Canada), 2014.
520 $a In this dissertation, I defend reductive physicalism, according to which (in particular) mental properties are type-identical to physical properties. I use a burden of proof strategy to defend the position, established by appealing to scientific practice, methodological considerations, and analogies between higher-level properties and paradigm cases of reduction. This strategy allows various non-reductive and anti-physicalist positions to be explored in the context of arguments presented in their favour.
520 $a Non-reductive physicalists argue that some higher-level properties are not type-identical to any physical properties. Perhaps the principal argument along these lines is the Multiple Realizability Argument, while a common reductivist reply appeals to the Disjunctive Strategy. I establish a framework for understanding this dialectic that reveals the logical space available to non-reductive physicalists, allowing me to make comprehensive rejoinders to the best available responses to the Disjunctive Strategy. For example, according to a recent, powers-based response, a higher-level property instance has a proper subset of the causal powers of its realizer on the occasion, making the higher-level property instance ontologically distinct and causally autonomous from its realizer. Using my framework, I argue that the higher-level property is not token-distinct from its realizer. Furthermore, even if it were, its supposed causal autonomy is just a special case of the counterfactual stability of disjunctions.
520 $a Anti-physicalists argue that some properties---specifically phenomenal properties---are "over and above" physical properties, as per some strong form of property dualism. The main anti-physicalist arguments are the Knowledge and Conceivability Arguments. I argue that, perhaps surprisingly, these arguments actually exclude popular versions of strong emergentism (those according to which phenomenal properties are lawfully, downwardly causal), or at least render them less plausible than physicalist counterparts.
520 $a Strong emergentism therefore relies mostly on its bare empirical possibility for support, which makes it resistant to a priori philosophical counterarguments. However, philosophical analysis can be used to show that strong emergentism requires the existence of an emergent causal law, which itself requires a discontinuity in some effect as a function of complexity. I argue that the existence of such a discontinuity is empirically very unlikely given what is already known about neural systems.
590 $a School code: 0779.
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
650 4 $a Metaphysics. $3 517082
690 $a 0422
690 $a 0396
710 2 $a University of Toronto (Canada). $b Philosophy. $3 3180627
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 76-08A(E).
790 $a 0779
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2014
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3686843