東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Hume-inspired metaphysics.

Segal, Aaron.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Hume-inspired metaphysics.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Hume-inspired metaphysics./
Author:	Segal, Aaron.
Description:	236 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-06(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International75-06A(E).
Subject:	Metaphysics. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3585403
ISBN:	9781303776960

Hume-inspired metaphysics.
Segal, Aaron.

Hume-inspired metaphysics. - 236 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-06(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2013.

This dissertation focuses on David Lewis's Patchwork Principle. That principle says, very roughly, that scenarios that are "patched" together from other possible scenarios are themselves possible. Thus, there are no metaphysically necessary connections between distinct things. More broadly, my dissertation is concerned with the many components of Lewis's metaphysical system which are inspired by Hume's claim that the world's contents are "entirely loose and separate." I first show that if one makes certain natural assumptions, the Patchwork Principle implies the rest of those Hume-inspired components. It particular, it appears to imply that causal, nomic, and temporal-direction relations are all extrinsic (and always extrinsic to their bearers), and that the causal and nomic relations globally supervene on the non-causal non-nomic properties and relations. Thus, Lewis's set of metaphysical views is systematic not only insofar as many of its members are inspired by Hume's denial of necessary connections, but in the more profound way that its least contentious member appears to imply many of its more contentious members: it seems to present us with a stark dilemma, a dilemma about whether to accept or reject Lewis's entire Humean system.

ISBN: 9781303776960Subjects--Topical Terms:

517082
Metaphysics.

Hume-inspired metaphysics.
LDR:03227nmm a2200301 4500 001 2074374
005 20161004114917.5
008 170521s2013 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781303776960
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI3585403
035 $a AAI3585403
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Segal, Aaron. $3 3189689
245 1 0 $a Hume-inspired metaphysics.
300 $a 236 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-06(E), Section: A.
500 $a Advisers: Alvin Plantinga; Peter van Inwagen.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Notre Dame, 2013.
520 $a This dissertation focuses on David Lewis's Patchwork Principle. That principle says, very roughly, that scenarios that are "patched" together from other possible scenarios are themselves possible. Thus, there are no metaphysically necessary connections between distinct things. More broadly, my dissertation is concerned with the many components of Lewis's metaphysical system which are inspired by Hume's claim that the world's contents are "entirely loose and separate." I first show that if one makes certain natural assumptions, the Patchwork Principle implies the rest of those Hume-inspired components. It particular, it appears to imply that causal, nomic, and temporal-direction relations are all extrinsic (and always extrinsic to their bearers), and that the causal and nomic relations globally supervene on the non-causal non-nomic properties and relations. Thus, Lewis's set of metaphysical views is systematic not only insofar as many of its members are inspired by Hume's denial of necessary connections, but in the more profound way that its least contentious member appears to imply many of its more contentious members: it seems to present us with a stark dilemma, a dilemma about whether to accept or reject Lewis's entire Humean system.
520 $a Such a dilemma would be difficult indeed. On the one hand, I go on to offer an argument for the Patchwork Principle, an argument which seems as compelling as arguments get in this area. On the other hand, I also argue that the Patchwork Principle's apparent implications are untenable, because they are inconsistent with the existence (or even the possibility) of conscious beings like ourselves. The dilemma is thus a conundrum.
520 $a The crux of my solution to this conundrum (and dilemma) is that the apparent implications of the Patchwork Principle are merely apparent, since one of the "very natural assumptions I made in arguing for those implications -- that there can be concrete objects that do not share any parts -- is false. Indeed, my solution assumes that of necessity, any two concrete objects overlap. Thus, while the Patchwork Principle is maintained, it is emptied of its content. And Hume's claim that the world's contents are "entirely loose and separate," along with several components of Lewis's metaphysical system which are inspired by it, are shown to be far wide of the mark.
590 $a School code: 0165.
650 4 $a Metaphysics. $3 517082
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
690 $a 0396
690 $a 0422
710 2 $a University of Notre Dame. $b Philosophy. $3 3185126
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 75-06A(E).
790 $a 0165
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2013
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3585403