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Essays in continuous-strategy evolut...

Cheung, Man-Wah.

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Essays in continuous-strategy evolutionary dynamics.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays in continuous-strategy evolutionary dynamics./
Author:	Cheung, Man-Wah.
Description:	143 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-11(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-11A(E).
Subject:	Economics. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3708042
ISBN:	9781321829662

Essays in continuous-strategy evolutionary dynamics.
Cheung, Man-Wah.

Essays in continuous-strategy evolutionary dynamics. - 143 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-11(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2015.

This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters. The first chapter studies pairwise comparison dynamics for population games with continuous strategy space. We show that the pairwise comparison dynamic is well-defined if certain mild Lipschitz continuity conditions are satisfied. We establish Nash stationarity and positive correlation for pairwise comparison dynamics. Finally, we prove global convergence and local stability under general deterministic evolutionary dynamics in potential games, and global asymptotic stability under pairwise comparison dynamics in contractive games.

ISBN: 9781321829662Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.

Essays in continuous-strategy evolutionary dynamics.
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020 $a 9781321829662
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100 1 $a Cheung, Man-Wah. $3 3189009
245 1 0 $a Essays in continuous-strategy evolutionary dynamics.
300 $a 143 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-11(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: William H. Sandholm.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2015.
520 $a This dissertation consists of three self-contained chapters. The first chapter studies pairwise comparison dynamics for population games with continuous strategy space. We show that the pairwise comparison dynamic is well-defined if certain mild Lipschitz continuity conditions are satisfied. We establish Nash stationarity and positive correlation for pairwise comparison dynamics. Finally, we prove global convergence and local stability under general deterministic evolutionary dynamics in potential games, and global asymptotic stability under pairwise comparison dynamics in contractive games.
520 $a The second chapter studies imitative dynamics for population games with continuous strategy space. We define imitative dynamics -- which include the replicator dynamic as a special case -- as evolutionary dynamics that satisfy the imitative property and payoff monotonicity. Our definition of payoff monotonicity is different from the one defined in Oechssler and Riedel (2002). We find that our definition is better at capturing the notion of payoff monotonicity for the finite strategy case (cf. Weibull (1995)), and Oechssler and Riedel (2002)'s definition is closer to aggregate monotonicity in the sense of Samuelson and Zhang (1992). We provide sufficient conditions for imitative dynamics and general evolutionary dynamics to be well-defined. Finally, we extend general properties of imitative dynamics as well as global convergence and local stability results in potential games from finite strategy settings to continuous strategy settings.
520 $a The third chapter proposes a model of cultural evolution to show how cultural polarization arises through an evolutionary process. In our model, agents are assumed to have "cultural distastes" towards other agents, which affects their incentives in inculcation in the inter-generational cultural transmission process as in Bisin and Verdier (2001). Moreover, we assume that each agent's "cultural distaste" towards another agent is an increasing function of the cultural distance between them -- the distance between that agent's preference trait and his own preference trait in the trait space. This assumption captures people's general tendencies of evaluating culturally more distant people with stronger biases, and it is most easily to be modeled using a continuous preference trait space. We find that the curvature of the "cultural distaste" function plays an important role in determining the long-run cultural phenomena. In particular, when "cultural distaste" is a convex function of cultural distance, only the most extremely polarized state is a stable limit point. Therefore, our model provides a theoretical explanation for cultural polarization.
590 $a School code: 0262.
650 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0511
710 2 $a The University of Wisconsin - Madison. $b Economics. $3 2094978
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 76-11A(E).
790 $a 0262
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2015
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3708042