東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Essays on finance and banking.

Jochem, Torsten.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Essays on finance and banking.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on finance and banking./
作者:	Jochem, Torsten.
面頁冊數:	170 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-03(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International75-03A(E).
標題:	Economics. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3577012
ISBN:	9781303590481

Essays on finance and banking.
Jochem, Torsten.

Essays on finance and banking. - 170 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-03(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pittsburgh, 2013.

This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.

A urry of new regulation was passed in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007. Much remains however unknown about policies designed to prevent a repeat. In this dissertation I investigate two such regulatory approaches in financial and banking markets. In Chapter 2 I present an analysis of a revision of proxy access rules as it was mandated by Congress in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act and subsequently implemented by the SEC in August 2010. Proxy access---the right for shareholders to nominate directors to a firm's board---lies at the heart of shareholder control and the monitoring process of management. I use the repeal of a new proxy access regime by the U.S. Court of Appeals as a natural experiment to quantify the costs and benefits associated with proxy access. The findings indicate that proxy access resulted in an increase of shareholder wealth for firms with agency issues, smaller firms, and firms where more investors qualified to make use of it. There are no valuation changes for large firms, firms without any agency issues and firms with special-interest investors. The results indicate that the market valued the empowerment of shareholders positively and calls for renewed regulatory attention to proxy access. Chapter 3 analyzes the e ects from portfolio diversification and banking competition on the stability of U.S. banks during the 2008-2011 banking crisis in which more than 10% of U.S. banks ceased to exist. To do so, the analysis makes use of exogenous cross-sectional and time-series variation in states' branching restrictions, the degree of county business cycle integration, and topographic variation due to oceans and international borders that limited the potential to diversify. I find that both banking competition and portfolio diversification significantly reduced the failure probability of banks thereby providing a policy rationale to reduce the financial fragmentation of U.S. banking markets, to promote banking competition and an overall greater degree of diversification.

ISBN: 9781303590481Subjects--Topical Terms:

517137
Economics.

Essays on finance and banking.
LDR:02970nmm a2200301 4500 001 2073288
005 20160915132418.5
008 170521s2013 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781303590481
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI3577012
035 $a AAI3577012
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Jochem, Torsten. $3 3188524
245 1 0 $a Essays on finance and banking.
300 $a 170 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-03(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Daniel Berkowitz.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Pittsburgh, 2013.
506 $a This item is not available from ProQuest Dissertations & Theses.
520 $a A urry of new regulation was passed in the wake of the financial crisis of 2007. Much remains however unknown about policies designed to prevent a repeat. In this dissertation I investigate two such regulatory approaches in financial and banking markets. In Chapter 2 I present an analysis of a revision of proxy access rules as it was mandated by Congress in the 2010 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act and subsequently implemented by the SEC in August 2010. Proxy access---the right for shareholders to nominate directors to a firm's board---lies at the heart of shareholder control and the monitoring process of management. I use the repeal of a new proxy access regime by the U.S. Court of Appeals as a natural experiment to quantify the costs and benefits associated with proxy access. The findings indicate that proxy access resulted in an increase of shareholder wealth for firms with agency issues, smaller firms, and firms where more investors qualified to make use of it. There are no valuation changes for large firms, firms without any agency issues and firms with special-interest investors. The results indicate that the market valued the empowerment of shareholders positively and calls for renewed regulatory attention to proxy access. Chapter 3 analyzes the e ects from portfolio diversification and banking competition on the stability of U.S. banks during the 2008-2011 banking crisis in which more than 10% of U.S. banks ceased to exist. To do so, the analysis makes use of exogenous cross-sectional and time-series variation in states' branching restrictions, the degree of county business cycle integration, and topographic variation due to oceans and international borders that limited the potential to diversify. I find that both banking competition and portfolio diversification significantly reduced the failure probability of banks thereby providing a policy rationale to reduce the financial fragmentation of U.S. banking markets, to promote banking competition and an overall greater degree of diversification.
590 $a School code: 0178.
650 4 $a Economics. $3 517137
650 4 $a Finance. $3 542899
650 4 $a Banking. $2 bicssc $3 1557594
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0770
710 2 $a University of Pittsburgh. $b Economics. $3 2093792
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 75-03A(E).
790 $a 0178
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2013
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3577012