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Epistemic Value Pluralism.

Lockhart, Michael.

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Epistemic Value Pluralism.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Epistemic Value Pluralism./
Author:	Lockhart, Michael.
Description:	175 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-12(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International73-12A(E).
Subject:	Philosophy. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=NR87890
ISBN:	9780494878903

Epistemic Value Pluralism.
Lockhart, Michael.

Epistemic Value Pluralism. - 175 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-12(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Alberta (Canada), 2012.

Philosophers have, for the most part, taken for granted that all epistemic value is derived from the truth goal. Despite the recent development of virtue epistemology and its promise to reframe traditional problems, epistemic value monism remains largely unchallenged. I argue that once one conceptually prioritises agents over beliefs as virtue theories purport to do, value pluralism is implied.

ISBN: 9780494878903Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Epistemic Value Pluralism.
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020 $a 9780494878903
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAINR87890
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100 1 $a Lockhart, Michael. $3 3185149
245 1 0 $a Epistemic Value Pluralism.
300 $a 175 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 73-12(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Adam Morton.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Alberta (Canada), 2012.
520 $a Philosophers have, for the most part, taken for granted that all epistemic value is derived from the truth goal. Despite the recent development of virtue epistemology and its promise to reframe traditional problems, epistemic value monism remains largely unchallenged. I argue that once one conceptually prioritises agents over beliefs as virtue theories purport to do, value pluralism is implied.
520 $a In fact, monism becomes increasingly implausible once we acknowledge that the primary object of evaluation is a situated, embodied, embedded, and bounded agent.
520 $a My arguments take two forms. First, I distinguish between veridical virtues and virtues of epistemic usefulness. Where the former aim at the truth goal, the latter does not. I argue that there are both commonsense and paradoxical virtues of epistemic usefulness that intellectual exemplars exhibit that cannot be accounted for under monism.
520 $a Second, I argue that two prominent views in epistemology that claim to reject monism are suspiciously myopic and that a full commitment to pluralism is better-equipped to handle many traditional topics in epistemology such as the value problem, understanding, epistemic autonomy and responsibility, and wisdom.
590 $a School code: 0351.
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
650 4 $a Epistemology. $3 896969
690 $a 0422
690 $a 0393
710 2 $a University of Alberta (Canada). $3 626651
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 73-12A(E).
790 $a 0351
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2012
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=NR87890