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Facts as reasons: The role of experi...

Palmer, Elizabeth A. N.

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Facts as reasons: The role of experience in empricial justification.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Facts as reasons: The role of experience in empricial justification./
作者:	Palmer, Elizabeth A. N.
面頁冊數:	239 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-07(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International75-07A(E).
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3614786
ISBN:	9781303804380

Facts as reasons: The role of experience in empricial justification.
Palmer, Elizabeth A. N.

Facts as reasons: The role of experience in empricial justification. - 239 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-07(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Indiana University, 2014.

The purpose of this dissertation is to clarify the role of perceptual experiences in justifying our observational beliefs. I argue that insofar as perceptual experiences constitute our direct awareness of facts---complex worldly structures composed of objects, events, their properties and relations---these experiences provide our reasons for believing observational propositions. My central contention that facts comprise our reasons for believing observational propositions emerges as the facts as reasons model. In developing this, I argue that facts satisfy the conditions for being a reason: (1) they stand in objective evidentiary relations to propositions, and (2) they are employable in our reasoning and justificatory activity. Next, I argue that facts can be the bases of our observational beliefs, even if basing a belief that p on X requires an agent to believe that X is a reason for p. I also explain how facts guide us in our observational beliefs and how we are epistemically responsible in believing observational propositions on the basis of facts. Finally, I respond to three residual worries thought to bar facts from being reasons: the rational force worry, the sameness of reasons problem, and the wrong verdict problem. With the model thus defended, I consider its implications for the Given, the structure of justification, and the Intentionalism versus Disjunctivism debate.

ISBN: 9781303804380Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Facts as reasons: The role of experience in empricial justification.
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