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Moral realism and reliance on moral ...

Blanchard, Joshua.

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Moral realism and reliance on moral testimony.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Moral realism and reliance on moral testimony./
作者:	Blanchard, Joshua.
面頁冊數:	33 p.
附註:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 53-01.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International53-01(E).
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=1557077
ISBN:	9781303939587

Moral realism and reliance on moral testimony.
Blanchard, Joshua.

Moral realism and reliance on moral testimony. - 33 p.

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 53-01.

Thesis (M.A.)--The University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, 2014.

Several philosophers have recently argued that there is something inappropriate about relying on moral testimony and that this has potential implications for the nature of morality. Specifically, some have thought that the inappropriateness of relying on moral testimony poses a special problem for moral realism, on which there are good grounds for predicting that such reliance is actually appropriate. In this paper, I argue that moral realism only predicts that reliance on moral testimony is epistemically appropriate, but that, as a metaethical thesis, it is silent on whether such reliance is morally appropriate. I argue further that there are no good grounds for thinking that reliance on moral testimony is in fact epistemically inappropriate. After presenting what I think is the best explanation for the moral inappropriateness of reliance on moral testimony, I argue that, contra several recent philosophers, it is only sometimes inappropriate. There are some cases where reliance on moral testimony is not only appropriate but both epistemically and morally important.

ISBN: 9781303939587Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Moral realism and reliance on moral testimony.
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520 $a Several philosophers have recently argued that there is something inappropriate about relying on moral testimony and that this has potential implications for the nature of morality. Specifically, some have thought that the inappropriateness of relying on moral testimony poses a special problem for moral realism, on which there are good grounds for predicting that such reliance is actually appropriate. In this paper, I argue that moral realism only predicts that reliance on moral testimony is epistemically appropriate, but that, as a metaethical thesis, it is silent on whether such reliance is morally appropriate. I argue further that there are no good grounds for thinking that reliance on moral testimony is in fact epistemically inappropriate. After presenting what I think is the best explanation for the moral inappropriateness of reliance on moral testimony, I argue that, contra several recent philosophers, it is only sometimes inappropriate. There are some cases where reliance on moral testimony is not only appropriate but both epistemically and morally important.
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