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Knowledge from knowledge: An essay o...

Martins Borges, Rodrigo.

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Knowledge from knowledge: An essay on inferential knowledge.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Knowledge from knowledge: An essay on inferential knowledge./
作者:	Martins Borges, Rodrigo.
面頁冊數:	177 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-07(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International77-07A(E).
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=10019318
ISBN:	9781339510132

Knowledge from knowledge: An essay on inferential knowledge.
Martins Borges, Rodrigo.

Knowledge from knowledge: An essay on inferential knowledge. - 177 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 77-07(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Rutgers The State University of New Jersey - New Brunswick, 2015.

Under what conditions do we have inferential knowledge? I propose and defend the following principle: S knows that p via inference only if S knows all the premises essentially involved in her inference in support of p - "KFK" for short. Even though KFK is at least tacitly endorsed by many figures in the history of philosophy, from Aristotle through Descartes, and Kant to Bertrand Russell---and, more recently, by David Armstrong---KFK has fallen into disfavor among epistemologists over the past fifty years. In response to Edmund Gettier's legendary paper, many have proposed views according to which one's reasoning is a source of knowledge even if one fails to know some or all premises essentially involved in one's reasoning, while others have given up offering a theory of inferential knowledge and have focused on reasoning as a source of justified belief instead. Unfortunately, these accounts that deal with inferential knowledge are problematic; they cannot, for example, fully explain our common practice of evaluating negatively inferences with unknown premises. They also seem to rely on an overly narrow understanding of the so-called "Gettier Problem". This dissertation aims at updating the approach to reasoning that was popular before Gettier by building on the framework of Timothy Williamson's "knowledge-first" epistemology. The aim is to carefully elaborate the view that reasoning yields knowledge only if all the premises essentially involved are also known.

ISBN: 9781339510132Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Knowledge from knowledge: An essay on inferential knowledge.
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