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Markets without democracy, democracy...

Nevitt, Christopher Earle.

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Markets without democracy, democracy without markets: Transformations from Leninism in China and the former Soviet Union.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Markets without democracy, democracy without markets: Transformations from Leninism in China and the former Soviet Union./
Author:	Nevitt, Christopher Earle.
Description:	306 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 58-08, Section: A, page: 3291.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International58-08A.
Subject:	Political science. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9804521
ISBN:	9780591543575

Markets without democracy, democracy without markets: Transformations from Leninism in China and the former Soviet Union.
Nevitt, Christopher Earle.

Markets without democracy, democracy without markets: Transformations from Leninism in China and the former Soviet Union. - 306 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 58-08, Section: A, page: 3291.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1997.

Remarkable economic and political transformations have been taking place throughout the once-Leninist world. The question the dissertation asks is: What are the effects of pre-existing Leninist institutions on the establishment and functioning of new market-democratic institutions in these countries? Specifically, this dissertation focuses on two categories and cases of partial reform from Leninism--marketization without democratization in China, and democratization without marketization in the former-Soviet Union. The empirical work takes the form of a case-study of a major city in each country--Tianjin and Leningrad/St. Petersburg.

ISBN: 9780591543575Subjects--Topical Terms:

528916
Political science.

Markets without democracy, democracy without markets: Transformations from Leninism in China and the former Soviet Union.
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100 1 $a Nevitt, Christopher Earle. $3 3184661
245 1 0 $a Markets without democracy, democracy without markets: Transformations from Leninism in China and the former Soviet Union.
300 $a 306 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 58-08, Section: A, page: 3291.
500 $a Chair: Susan L. Shirk.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, San Diego, 1997.
520 $a Remarkable economic and political transformations have been taking place throughout the once-Leninist world. The question the dissertation asks is: What are the effects of pre-existing Leninist institutions on the establishment and functioning of new market-democratic institutions in these countries? Specifically, this dissertation focuses on two categories and cases of partial reform from Leninism--marketization without democratization in China, and democratization without marketization in the former-Soviet Union. The empirical work takes the form of a case-study of a major city in each country--Tianjin and Leningrad/St. Petersburg.
520 $a The argument put forward is that pre-existing Leninist institutions structure subsequent economic and political reform by structuring the behavior of politicians. The peculiar economic and political institutions of Leninism create a unique set of incentives for career-seeking politicians. Partial reform creates new opportunities or constraints for politicians, but in the context of those institutional elements of Leninism that persist. The peculiar new set of incentives thus defined sets in motion political dynamics that diverge in important and systematic ways from those of reform in non-Leninist contexts.
520 $a The dissertation begins by establishing a model of the Leninist institutional starting point. This model is then systematically altered in ways representing the two categories of partial reform to be explored. From these exercises are derived the behavioral consequences of each category of partial reform for rational self-interested political actors. These expectations are then applied and tested against the experience of Chinese marketization in Tianjin, and Soviet democratization in Leningrad/St. Petersburg,
520 $a In Tianjin, contrary to conventional wisdom but consistent with expectations from the model, market reform is not slowed by lower-level officials, but speeded up; state enterprises continue to dominate the economy under market conditions; and large-scale private entrepreneurs are actively co-opted by the local Party-state. In Leningrad/St. Petersburg, also contrary to conventional wisdom but consistent with the model, elections do not serve to establish a democratic constitutional order, but instead spark a sharp constitutional crisis between newly-democratic institutions at and between all territorial levels; render economic reform largely moot as a policy issue; and result in a sharp re-centralization of power and diminution of popular accountability.
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650 4 $a Asian history. $2 bicssc $3 1099323
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710 2 0 $a University of California, San Diego. $3 1018093
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 58-08A.
790 $a 0033
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 1997
793 $a English
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