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The behavior of firms' market shares...

Lu, Laura.

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The behavior of firms' market shares under cartel conditions: Further analysis of the Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The behavior of firms' market shares under cartel conditions: Further analysis of the Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886./
Author:	Lu, Laura.
Description:	171 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 50-06, Section: A, page: 1762.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International50-06A.
Subject:	Economic theory. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=8921193

The behavior of firms' market shares under cartel conditions: Further analysis of the Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886.
Lu, Laura.

The behavior of firms' market shares under cartel conditions: Further analysis of the Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886. - 171 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 50-06, Section: A, page: 1762.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1988.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

A symmetric supergame equilibrium of an industry is described in Green and Porter (1984) and Porter (1983a), where a self-enforcing cartel agreement can be maintained by reverting to one-period Cournot Nash equilibrium for a fixed number of periods as "punishment" whenever the observed market price falls below the trigger price. A low price may signal either deviations from the collusive output level or a "downward" demand shock from a stochastic component in the market demand curve. In the model, firms can observe only their own output level and a common market price.Subjects--Topical Terms:

1556984
Economic theory.

The behavior of firms' market shares under cartel conditions: Further analysis of the Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886.
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100 1 $a Lu, Laura. $3 3174986
245 1 4 $a The behavior of firms' market shares under cartel conditions: Further analysis of the Joint Executive Committee, 1880-1886.
300 $a 171 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 50-06, Section: A, page: 1762.
500 $a Supervisor: John C. Hause.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--State University of New York at Stony Brook, 1988.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
520 $a A symmetric supergame equilibrium of an industry is described in Green and Porter (1984) and Porter (1983a), where a self-enforcing cartel agreement can be maintained by reverting to one-period Cournot Nash equilibrium for a fixed number of periods as "punishment" whenever the observed market price falls below the trigger price. A low price may signal either deviations from the collusive output level or a "downward" demand shock from a stochastic component in the market demand curve. In the model, firms can observe only their own output level and a common market price.
520 $a The dissertation attempts to extend the work of Porter and Green by studying theoretically and empirically the behavior of the firms' market shares after relaxing the assumption of identical cost functions for the firms, a modification supported by the railroad data. It is assumed that the marginal cost function for firm $i$ is $MC\sb{i}$ = $f(q\sb{i}$/$k\sb{i}$) where $q\sb{i}$ is the output of firm $i$, the $k\sb{i}$'s are constants, $k\sb{i}$ $>$ 0, $\sum\sb{i}$ $k\sb{i}$ = 1, and $f\sp\prime$ $>$ 0. The firms' market shares vary between the phases of quasi-cooperation and punishment in the Green and Porter model if the $k\sb{i}$'s differ between the firms. The intuition supporting this belief comes from a static analysis of duopoly. The firm with the smaller $k$ will have a larger market share under Cournot Nash equilibrium than under joint profit maximization, since the smaller firm will have a larger perceived marginal revenue than the larger firm at the Cournot Nash equilibrium.
520 $a A major empirical issue in this study is whether weekly data of the Joint Executive Committee railroad cartel for the 1880s containing five asymmetric cost firms over the simple period show the theoretically expected behavior in the individual firm's market share between the quasi-cooperative and quasi-competitive periods. Some measurements of variability of market share within the two supergame states are undertaken in order to examine more carefully the nature of cartel share behavior in the presence of demand uncertainty. An empirical model is set up for the analysis of market share data in order to understand the relationships between market share, size of firm, and other exogenous variables.
590 $a School code: 0771.
650 4 $a Economic theory. $3 1556984
650 4 $a Social sciences education. $3 2144735
650 4 $a Industrial arts education. $3 3173045
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0534
690 $a 0521
710 2 $a State University of New York at Stony Brook. $3 1019194
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 50-06A.
790 $a 0771
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 1988
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=8921193