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Essays in Microeconomics of Banking.

Mangla, Vishal.

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Essays in Microeconomics of Banking.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays in Microeconomics of Banking./
作者:	Mangla, Vishal.
面頁冊數:	221 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-01(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International75-01A(E).
標題:	Finance. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3595674
ISBN:	9781303415524

Essays in Microeconomics of Banking.
Mangla, Vishal.

Essays in Microeconomics of Banking. - 221 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-01(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2013.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

Chapter 1 presents the case for procyclical capital requirement policy---lower requirement during booms and higher requirement during recessions. Our argument is based on the fact that banks strategically shift their capital into and out of the regulation purview depending upon the business cycle and the severity of the regulation. Our policy specifies the level of capital requirement as a function of the observed relative size of the unregulated and regulated banking sectors. This specification achieves the optimal aggregate risk exposure by obtaining the right mix of the two sectors. We show that our regulation policy has several desirable features expected of a macro policy.

ISBN: 9781303415524Subjects--Topical Terms:

542899
Finance.

Essays in Microeconomics of Banking.
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300 $a 221 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-01(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Arvind Krishnamurthy.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Northwestern University, 2013.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
520 $a Chapter 1 presents the case for procyclical capital requirement policy---lower requirement during booms and higher requirement during recessions. Our argument is based on the fact that banks strategically shift their capital into and out of the regulation purview depending upon the business cycle and the severity of the regulation. Our policy specifies the level of capital requirement as a function of the observed relative size of the unregulated and regulated banking sectors. This specification achieves the optimal aggregate risk exposure by obtaining the right mix of the two sectors. We show that our regulation policy has several desirable features expected of a macro policy.
520 $a Chapter 2 presents a model in which uncertainty in the amount of capital invested in an investment strategy leads to aggressive investment, or crowding of investors, into that strategy. The model allows analysis of regulations regarding disclosure of capital committed to a strategy. Interestingly, we find that for a regulator who perfectly observes the size of crowding it is suboptimal to reveal her information to all the investors in order to mitigate the crowding, and that there is a case for strategic blocking of the information. We also show that to implement the optimal disclosure policy the regulator requires a commitment device, in the absence of which there occurs a so-called policy trap.
520 $a Chapter 3 documents that an increase in Treasury supply net of Treasuries held by Fed is associated with an increase in outstanding savings deposits and a decrease in outstanding time deposits supplied by the commercial banking sector. Breaking the aggregate time deposits by denomination---defining more than $100,000 as large---I find that large time deposits have higher elasticity with respect to net Treasury supply compared to that of small time deposits. In the cross section of banks, large time deposits of big banks have higher elasticity than that of small banks. However, bank size does not matter for respective elasticities savings and small time deposits. To explain these patterns, I present a simple theoretical model in which households derive utility from their holdings of bank deposits.
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