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Trusting with skill: Testimony, reli...

Patwardhan, Shyam.

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Trusting with skill: Testimony, reliability and epistemic justification.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Trusting with skill: Testimony, reliability and epistemic justification./
Author:	Patwardhan, Shyam.
Description:	190 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-09(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International74-09A(E).
Subject:	Epistemology. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3561078
ISBN:	9781303078552

Trusting with skill: Testimony, reliability and epistemic justification.
Patwardhan, Shyam.

Trusting with skill: Testimony, reliability and epistemic justification. - 190 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-09(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Oklahoma, 2013.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

The majority of what you believe is based on the testimony of others; what your parents and teachers have taught you, what you read online or see on the news, etc. And most of the time you accept what these sources tell you without independently verifying them with your own senses or reasoning. If these beliefs (as well as all of the beliefs built upon them) are thought to be justified, then an account of testimonial justification must be detailed which can account for this justification. If such an account cannot be given, it at best becomes a mystery how those beliefs are justified, and at worse you are thrust into a new kind of skepticism since most of what you believe will fail to be knowledge. In this dissertation I examine the two main accounts of testimonial justification in the literature, show how each is inadequate, and ultimately give my own account of how beliefs based on testimony can be, and usually are, justified.

ISBN: 9781303078552Subjects--Topical Terms:

896969
Epistemology.

Trusting with skill: Testimony, reliability and epistemic justification.
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020 $a 9781303078552
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI3561078
035 $a AAI3561078
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Patwardhan, Shyam. $3 3171728
245 1 0 $a Trusting with skill: Testimony, reliability and epistemic justification.
300 $a 190 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-09(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Wayne Riggs.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Oklahoma, 2013.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
520 $a The majority of what you believe is based on the testimony of others; what your parents and teachers have taught you, what you read online or see on the news, etc. And most of the time you accept what these sources tell you without independently verifying them with your own senses or reasoning. If these beliefs (as well as all of the beliefs built upon them) are thought to be justified, then an account of testimonial justification must be detailed which can account for this justification. If such an account cannot be given, it at best becomes a mystery how those beliefs are justified, and at worse you are thrust into a new kind of skepticism since most of what you believe will fail to be knowledge. In this dissertation I examine the two main accounts of testimonial justification in the literature, show how each is inadequate, and ultimately give my own account of how beliefs based on testimony can be, and usually are, justified.
520 $a Chapters One through Four examine the two main theories of testimonial justification, reductionism and non-reductionism, and I show that both views possess fatal flaws which render them unsuitable as plausible explanations for how agents can justifiably hold testimonial-based beliefs. In Chapter Five I examine a couple of promising nonstandard accounts of testimonial justification; Jennifer Lackey's 'duelist' account and Sanford Goldberg's 'extendedness hypothesis,' and ultimately dismiss these well. Finally, Chapter Six ends the dissertation by detailing my own account of testimonial justification and shows how it can avoid the problems which plague the theories above.
590 $a School code: 0169.
650 4 $a Epistemology. $3 896969
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
690 $a 0393
690 $a 0422
710 2 $a The University of Oklahoma. $b Department of Philosophy. $3 2101401
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 74-09A(E).
790 $a 0169
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2013
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3561078