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Managerial reputation and non-GAAP e...

Cheng, Yun.

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Managerial reputation and non-GAAP earnings disclosures.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Managerial reputation and non-GAAP earnings disclosures./
作者:	Cheng, Yun.
面頁冊數:	108 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-04(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International76-04A(E).
標題:	Business Administration, Accounting. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3647568
ISBN:	9781321404050

Managerial reputation and non-GAAP earnings disclosures.
Cheng, Yun.

Managerial reputation and non-GAAP earnings disclosures. - 108 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 76-04(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Florida Atlantic University, 2014.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

I examine how managerial reputation affects the quality of non-GAAP earnings disclosures and how the market reacts to non-GAAP earnings disclosures associated with managerial reputation. Although there was an initial dip in the frequency of non-GAAP earnings disclosures after SOX and Regulation G, the frequency of non-GAAP earnings disclosures has increased in recent years (Brown, Christensen, Elliott and Mergenthaler 2012). Motivated by the efficient contracting theory and managerial reputation incentives, I investigate whether reputable managers are associated with higher quality non-GAAP earnings disclosures. I also investigate whether the market is more responsive to non-GAAP earnings disclosed by reputable managers. Using empirical models modified from prior research, I find that reputable managers are less likely to disclose non-GAAP earnings, which is consistent with the efficient contracting explanation. I also find that reputable managers exclude more recurring items that are related to future operating earnings when they disclose non-GAAP earnings, which is consistent with the rent extraction explanation in prior research. Finally, I find that managerial reputation has an incremental effect on the market reaction and that the market is more responsive to non-GAAP earnings disclosed by reputable managers if the unexpected earnings are positive. The study contributes to both non-GAAP earnings disclosures literature and managerial reputation incentives literature. It also has implications for investors, managers, and regulators.

ISBN: 9781321404050Subjects--Topical Terms:

1020666
Business Administration, Accounting.

Managerial reputation and non-GAAP earnings disclosures.
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