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Dual-Class Firms' Choice of Performa...

Li, Ji.

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Dual-Class Firms' Choice of Performance Measures in CEO Stock Compensation Contracts.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Dual-Class Firms' Choice of Performance Measures in CEO Stock Compensation Contracts./
Author:	Li, Ji.
Description:	43 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-08(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International75-08A(E).
Subject:	Business Administration, Accounting. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3619268
ISBN:	9781303880957

Dual-Class Firms' Choice of Performance Measures in CEO Stock Compensation Contracts.
Li, Ji.

Dual-Class Firms' Choice of Performance Measures in CEO Stock Compensation Contracts. - 43 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-08(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Arizona State University, 2014.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

This study provides new evidence on the choice of performance measures used in dual-class firms to incentivize CEOs. The choice of performance measures is informative about the extent to which the board of directors focuses CEO efforts on firms' long-term versus short-term objectives. To empirically operationalize performance evaluation horizon, I measure the length of the performance evaluation period in CEO stock awards, the use of stock-based measures, and the use of peer-based measures. I collect data on 419 dual-class firms and match them with a control group of single-class firms. I find that market-based metrics are less likely to be used by dual-class firms relative to single-class firms. In addition, I find that peer-based measures are much less common for dual-class than single-class firms. These findings suggest that dual-class firms shield their executives from short-term market pressures and design stock compensation contracts that deemphasize volatile stock prices.

ISBN: 9781303880957Subjects--Topical Terms:

1020666
Business Administration, Accounting.

Dual-Class Firms' Choice of Performance Measures in CEO Stock Compensation Contracts.
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100 1 $a Li, Ji. $3 1033751
245 1 0 $a Dual-Class Firms' Choice of Performance Measures in CEO Stock Compensation Contracts.
300 $a 43 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-08(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Michal Matejka.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Arizona State University, 2014.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
520 $a This study provides new evidence on the choice of performance measures used in dual-class firms to incentivize CEOs. The choice of performance measures is informative about the extent to which the board of directors focuses CEO efforts on firms' long-term versus short-term objectives. To empirically operationalize performance evaluation horizon, I measure the length of the performance evaluation period in CEO stock awards, the use of stock-based measures, and the use of peer-based measures. I collect data on 419 dual-class firms and match them with a control group of single-class firms. I find that market-based metrics are less likely to be used by dual-class firms relative to single-class firms. In addition, I find that peer-based measures are much less common for dual-class than single-class firms. These findings suggest that dual-class firms shield their executives from short-term market pressures and design stock compensation contracts that deemphasize volatile stock prices.
590 $a School code: 0010.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Accounting. $3 1020666
690 $a 0272
710 2 $a Arizona State University. $b Accountancy. $3 2101297
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 75-08A(E).
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791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2014
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3619268