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The evolution of family firms: The e...

Li, Huimin.

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The evolution of family firms: The exit of founding families and the survival of family IPOs.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The evolution of family firms: The exit of founding families and the survival of family IPOs./
Author:	Li, Huimin.
Description:	229 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-11(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International75-11A(E).
Subject:	Economics, Finance. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3628504
ISBN:	9781321044737

The evolution of family firms: The exit of founding families and the survival of family IPOs.
Li, Huimin.

The evolution of family firms: The exit of founding families and the survival of family IPOs. - 229 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-11(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgia State University, 2014.

This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.

To study the evolution of family-controlled firms, I follow a sample of firms from the IPO to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted from the stock exchange. I use the longitudinal data to examine the influence of family characteristics on family control horizons, family firm evolution outcomes, and family firm performance. I find that greater founder involvement and extended family involvement at the IPO predict a longer family control horizon. Greater founder involvement and extended family involvement in year t predict a lower probability of family exit in year t+1 and year t+2. I find that family's excess voting rights and family descendant CEOs decrease firm value. In addition, family ownership decreases firm value but increases accounting performance. Further, I find that family firms with higher family ownership and multiple family members have less R&D expenditures but more capital expenditures. My findings suggest that families with greater involvement in the firm seek to maintain a longer control horizon. However, these families do not maintain an investment perspective that can increase long-term firm value. Instead, they seem to prefer safer investments and focus on accounting performance. The evolution of my sample firms suggests survivorship and selection issues in cross-sectional samples and demonstrates the importance of considering cohort effects and firms' evolution stages when we examine the influence of founders and families.

ISBN: 9781321044737Subjects--Topical Terms:

626650
Economics, Finance.

The evolution of family firms: The exit of founding families and the survival of family IPOs.
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100 1 $a Li, Huimin. $3 1937489
245 1 4 $a The evolution of family firms: The exit of founding families and the survival of family IPOs.
300 $a 229 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 75-11(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Harley E. Ryan, Jr.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Georgia State University, 2014.
506 $a This item must not be sold to any third party vendors.
506 $a This item must not be added to any third party search indexes.
520 $a To study the evolution of family-controlled firms, I follow a sample of firms from the IPO to the end of 2011 or until the firm is delisted from the stock exchange. I use the longitudinal data to examine the influence of family characteristics on family control horizons, family firm evolution outcomes, and family firm performance. I find that greater founder involvement and extended family involvement at the IPO predict a longer family control horizon. Greater founder involvement and extended family involvement in year t predict a lower probability of family exit in year t+1 and year t+2. I find that family's excess voting rights and family descendant CEOs decrease firm value. In addition, family ownership decreases firm value but increases accounting performance. Further, I find that family firms with higher family ownership and multiple family members have less R&D expenditures but more capital expenditures. My findings suggest that families with greater involvement in the firm seek to maintain a longer control horizon. However, these families do not maintain an investment perspective that can increase long-term firm value. Instead, they seem to prefer safer investments and focus on accounting performance. The evolution of my sample firms suggests survivorship and selection issues in cross-sectional samples and demonstrates the importance of considering cohort effects and firms' evolution stages when we examine the influence of founders and families.
590 $a School code: 0079.
650 4 $a Economics, Finance. $3 626650
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710 2 $a Georgia State University. $b Finance. $3 2094920
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 75-11A(E).
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791 $a Ph.D.
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856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3628504