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Mobilizing poor voters : = machine p...

Szwarcberg, Mariela Laura

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Mobilizing poor voters : = machine politics, clientelism, and social networks in Argentina /

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Mobilizing poor voters :/ Mariela Szwarcberg.
其他題名:	machine politics, clientelism, and social networks in Argentina /
作者:	Szwarcberg, Mariela Laura
出版者:	New York :Cambridge University Press, : 2015.,
面頁冊數:	xiii, 175 p. :ill. ;23 cm.
標題:	Poor - Political activity - Argentina. -
標題:	Argentina - Politics and government - 21st century. -
電子資源:	http://assets.cambridge.org/97811071/14081/cover/9781107114081.jpg
ISBN:	9781107534629

Mobilizing poor voters : = machine politics, clientelism, and social networks in Argentina /
Szwarcberg, Mariela Laura

Mobilizing poor voters :machine politics, clientelism, and social networks in Argentina /Mariela Szwarcberg. - New York :Cambridge University Press,2015. - xiii, 175 p. :ill. ;23 cm. - Structural analysis in the social sciences ;38.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 163-171) and index.

"Machine Politics, Clientelism, and Social Networks in Argentina Democracy has provided opportunities for political representation and accountability, but it has also created incentives for creating and maintaining clientelistic networks. Why has clientelism consolidated with the introduction of democracy? Drawing on network analysis, Politics on the Ground answers this question by describing and explaining the emergence, maintenance, and disappearance of political, partisan, and social networks in Argentina. Combining qualitative and quantitative data gathered during twenty-four months of field research in eight municipalities in Argentina, Politics on the Ground shows that when party leaders distribute political promotions to party candidates based only on the number of voters they mobilize, party leaders incentivize the use of clientelistic strategies among candidates competing to mobilize voters in poor neighborhoods. The logic of perverse incentives examined in this book explains why candidates who use clientelism succeed in getting elected and re- elected over time, contributing to the consolidation of political machines at the local level"--

ISBN: 9781107534629US33.99

LCCN: 2015014378Subjects--Topical Terms:

3165661
Poor
--Political activity--Argentina.Subjects--Geographical Terms:

3165660
Argentina
--Politics and government--21st century.

LC Class. No.: HC173 / .S99 2015

Dewey Class. No.: 323/.0420869420982

Mobilizing poor voters : = machine politics, clientelism, and social networks in Argentina /
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020 $a 9781107534629 $q (paperback) : $c US33.99
020 $a 9781107114081 $q (hardback)
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050 0 0 $a HC173 $b .S99 2015
082 0 0 $a 323/.0420869420982 $2 23
100 1 $a Szwarcberg, Mariela Laura $3 3165659
245 1 0 $a Mobilizing poor voters : $b machine politics, clientelism, and social networks in Argentina / $c Mariela Szwarcberg.
260 $a New York : $b Cambridge University Press, $c 2015.
300 $a xiii, 175 p. : $b ill. ; $c 23 cm.
490 0 $a Structural analysis in the social sciences ; $v 38
504 $a Includes bibliographical references (p. 163-171) and index.
520 $a "Machine Politics, Clientelism, and Social Networks in Argentina Democracy has provided opportunities for political representation and accountability, but it has also created incentives for creating and maintaining clientelistic networks. Why has clientelism consolidated with the introduction of democracy? Drawing on network analysis, Politics on the Ground answers this question by describing and explaining the emergence, maintenance, and disappearance of political, partisan, and social networks in Argentina. Combining qualitative and quantitative data gathered during twenty-four months of field research in eight municipalities in Argentina, Politics on the Ground shows that when party leaders distribute political promotions to party candidates based only on the number of voters they mobilize, party leaders incentivize the use of clientelistic strategies among candidates competing to mobilize voters in poor neighborhoods. The logic of perverse incentives examined in this book explains why candidates who use clientelism succeed in getting elected and re- elected over time, contributing to the consolidation of political machines at the local level"-- $c Provided by publisher.
650 0 $a Poor $x Political activity $z Argentina. $3 3165661
650 0 $a Social media $x Political aspects $z Argentina. $3 3165662
650 0 $a Political participation $z Argentina. $3 3165663
650 0 $a Voting $z Argentina. $3 3165664
651 0 $a Argentina $x Politics and government $y 21st century. $3 3165660
856 4 2 $3 Cover image $u http://assets.cambridge.org/97811071/14081/cover/9781107114081.jpg