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God and mental causation

Lim, Daniel.

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God and mental causation

紀錄類型:	書目-語言資料,印刷品 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	God and mental causation/ by Daniel Lim.
作者:	Lim, Daniel.
出版者:	Berlin, Heidelberg :Springer Berlin Heidelberg : : 2015.,
面頁冊數:	xiv, 100 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm.
內容註:	Chapter 1: The Supervenience Argument -- Chapter 2: Occasionalism -- Chapter 3: Overdetermination and Exclusion -- Chapter 4: The Existence of God.
Contained By:	Springer eBooks
標題:	Philosophy and religion. -
電子資源:	http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-47426-6
ISBN:	9783662474266 (electronic bk.)

God and mental causation
Lim, Daniel.

God and mental causation[electronic resource] /by Daniel Lim. - Berlin, Heidelberg :Springer Berlin Heidelberg :2015. - xiv, 100 p. :ill., digital ;24 cm. - SpringerBriefs in philosophy,2211-4548. - SpringerBriefs in philosophy..

Chapter 1: The Supervenience Argument -- Chapter 2: Occasionalism -- Chapter 3: Overdetermination and Exclusion -- Chapter 4: The Existence of God.

This book lies at the intersection of philosophy of mind and philosophy of religion and operates on the assumption that dialogue between the two disciplines can be fruitful. In particular it focuses on how debates in the philosophy of mind regarding the nature of mental causation relate to debates in the philosophy of religion regarding divine action, creaturely causation, and existence of God. The book is divided into two parts. The first deals with Jaegwon Kim's so-called Supervenience Argument (SA) against non-reductive physicalism. One important observation is that the structural similarities between non-reductive physicalism and 'orthodox' theism make it convenient to co-opt non-reductive physicalist solutions to the SA in defending the possibility of creaturely causation in the philosophy of religion. The SA is used as a foil to discuss the relative merits of Malebranche's so-called Conservation is Continuous Creation Argument for Occasionalism (CCCA) Moverover, the so-called compatibilist strategy (Karen Bennett 2003, 2009) for developing a non-reductive physicalist response to the Supervenience Argument is defended and developed. This strategy is then deployed in the philosophy of religion to defend the possibility of creaturely causation against the CCCA.

ISBN: 9783662474266 (electronic bk.)

Standard No.: 10.1007/978-3-662-47426-6doiSubjects--Topical Terms:

565077
Philosophy and religion.

LC Class. No.: BL51

Dewey Class. No.: 201.61

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