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Carbon Taxes as a Part of Fiscal Pol...

Barrage, Lint.

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Carbon Taxes as a Part of Fiscal Policy and Market Incentives for Environmental Stewardship.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Carbon Taxes as a Part of Fiscal Policy and Market Incentives for Environmental Stewardship./
Author:	Barrage, Lint.
Description:	189 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-11(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International74-11A(E).
Subject:	Economics, General. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3572032
ISBN:	9781303299469

Carbon Taxes as a Part of Fiscal Policy and Market Incentives for Environmental Stewardship.
Barrage, Lint.

Carbon Taxes as a Part of Fiscal Policy and Market Incentives for Environmental Stewardship. - 189 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-11(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2013.

This dissertation studies the provision of environmental public goods through price mechanisms. The first two chapters analyze the design of carbon taxes as a part of fiscal policy. The third chapter explores the ability of private markets to provide incentives for environmental stewardship.

ISBN: 9781303299469Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Carbon Taxes as a Part of Fiscal Policy and Market Incentives for Environmental Stewardship.
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100 1 $a Barrage, Lint. $3 2097308
245 1 0 $a Carbon Taxes as a Part of Fiscal Policy and Market Incentives for Environmental Stewardship.
300 $a 189 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-11(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: William Nordhaus.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Yale University, 2013.
520 $a This dissertation studies the provision of environmental public goods through price mechanisms. The first two chapters analyze the design of carbon taxes as a part of fiscal policy. The third chapter explores the ability of private markets to provide incentives for environmental stewardship.
520 $a Optimal Carbon Taxes as a Part of Fiscal Policy Chapters 1 and 2 investigate how carbon taxes should be structured as a part of fiscal policy. The literature on optimal carbon taxes generally abstracts from other taxes and prescribes Pigouvian carbon levies. However, when governments raise revenues with distortionary taxes, carbon levies have fiscal costs and benefits. While they raise revenues directly, they may simultaneously shrink the bases of other taxes (e.g., by decreasing employment). Chapters 1 and 2 thus study the design of carbon taxes alongside other, distortionary taxes.
520 $a Chapter 1 theoretically characterizes optimal carbon levies in a dynamic general equilibrium climate-economy model with linear taxes. Two main theoretical insights emerge. First, I demonstrate a theoretical relationship between the optimal taxation of carbon and of capital income. This link arises because carbon is conceptually equivalent to negative capital: Emissions accumulate in the atmosphere and decrease output. Setting carbon taxes below Pigouvian rates distorts incentives to invest in climate protection. This is analogous to capital income taxes, which distort incentives to invest in physical capital. I formally show that, if it is optimal to set capital income taxes to zero, then the optimal carbon tax fully internalizes production damages at the Pigouvian rate, even if labor markets are distorted.
520 $a Chapter 2 empirically quantifies optimal carbon taxes in a Climate Optimization Model of the Economy and Taxation (COMET). This integrated assessmnet model incorporates government revenue needs and linear tax policy choice in a climate-economy model based on the seminal DICE/RICE frameworks (Nordhaus, 2008). The three central findings are as follows. First, I compare optimal climate policy in the setting with distortionary taxes to the setting with lump-sum taxes considered in the literature. The main quantitative result is that optimal carbon tax schedules are 10 -- 30% lower when there are other, distortionary taxes. Optimal carbon prices start at $40 -- 55 per metric ton of carbon ($2005/mtC) in 2015, and rise to $400 -- 530/mtC by 2105. Second, I explore the quantitative implications of the theoretical motivation to separate production and utility damages. Based on a disaggregation of the established damage estimates underlying the DICE/RICE models, I argue that 70% of climate change impacts from 2.5° warming affect production; 30% affect utility directly. I further estimate that attributing all climate change impacts to utility (production) biases the optimal carbon tax estimate for the year 2015 downward by 20% (upward by 10%). Third, given the theoretical similarity between the distortionary impact of capital income taxes and of failure to enact carbon taxes, I compare the welfare costs of these policies empirically.
520 $a Advertising, Reputation, and Environmental Stewardship: Evidence from the BP Oil Spill (with Justine Hastings and Eric Chyn). Chapter 3 explores whether and how environmental protection can be provided by private markets. We study this question in the context of the April 2010 BP oil spill in the Gulf of Mexico. We use station-level data from a large sample of retail gasoline stations across the United States from January 2009 to March 2011 to examine the impacts of the oil spill on gasoline prices and demand. The analysis further considers how this impact varied (i) over time, (ii) across markets with different levels of environmental preferences, and (iii) with pre-spill exposure to BP advertising. From 2000 to 2008, BP rolled out the "Beyond Petroleum" advertising campaign, spending heavily to establish itself as an environmentally conscious company. Environmental stewardship is difficult for consumers to experience. This lack of observability potentially increases the incentive for false claims ("greenwashing"). Theoretical work on corporate social responsibility has demonstrated the critical importance of market punishment for such deviations to ensure sustainable provision of environmental quality (e.g., Besley and Gathak, 2007). The three main results are as follows. First, we find evidence consistent with consumer punishment of BP in the months after the spill. BP prices declined by a statistically and economically significant 4 cents per gallon on average, compared to control stations. Volumes declined by 3.5%. However, these negative impacts ceased after the oil leak was permanently sealed in September 2010. Second, the punishment was significantly stronger in areas where consumers have green preferences for other products. Third, we find that pre-spill exposure to BP advertising significantly softened the impact of the spill on BP prices. (Abstract shortened by UMI.).
590 $a School code: 0265.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Economics, Environmental. $3 1669564
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0438
710 2 $a Yale University. $b Economics. $3 2093909
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 74-11A(E).
790 $a 0265
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2013
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3572032