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Enforcement and equilibrium in the p...

Yang, Hai-Lan Helen.

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Enforcement and equilibrium in the permit markets when firms are risk averse.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Enforcement and equilibrium in the permit markets when firms are risk averse./
Author:	Yang, Hai-Lan Helen.
Description:	152 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-10(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International74-10A(E).
Subject:	Economics, General. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3566167
ISBN:	9781303169823

Enforcement and equilibrium in the permit markets when firms are risk averse.
Yang, Hai-Lan Helen.

Enforcement and equilibrium in the permit markets when firms are risk averse. - 152 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-10(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Iowa State University, 2013.

This paper explores the role of uncertainty, in the form of measurement error, in pollution regulation under a tradable permit system. In particular, we showed the neutrality between the penalty and the audit frequency does not hold when agents (firms) are risk averse. Firms respond to the weight change between penalty and monitoring effort by adjusting their demand for pollution permits, as well as their production/pollution decisions. We studied two forms of the measurement error when observing the emissions: additive and multiplicative. While there are some analytical results for a model with additive error, the same cannot be said when the error is multiplicative to the real emission. We then used numerical methods to simulate firms behavior and the industry equilibrium with multiplicative error, and to identify the best policy for the government.

ISBN: 9781303169823Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Enforcement and equilibrium in the permit markets when firms are risk averse.
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008 150210s2013 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781303169823
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI3566167
035 $a AAI3566167
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Yang, Hai-Lan Helen. $3 2097295
245 1 0 $a Enforcement and equilibrium in the permit markets when firms are risk averse.
300 $a 152 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-10(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Harvey E. Lapan.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Iowa State University, 2013.
520 $a This paper explores the role of uncertainty, in the form of measurement error, in pollution regulation under a tradable permit system. In particular, we showed the neutrality between the penalty and the audit frequency does not hold when agents (firms) are risk averse. Firms respond to the weight change between penalty and monitoring effort by adjusting their demand for pollution permits, as well as their production/pollution decisions. We studied two forms of the measurement error when observing the emissions: additive and multiplicative. While there are some analytical results for a model with additive error, the same cannot be said when the error is multiplicative to the real emission. We then used numerical methods to simulate firms behavior and the industry equilibrium with multiplicative error, and to identify the best policy for the government.
590 $a School code: 0097.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Economics, Environmental. $3 1669564
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0438
710 2 $a Iowa State University. $b Economics. $3 1033976
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 74-10A(E).
790 $a 0097
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2013
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3566167