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An international environmental agree...

Singer, Michael.

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An international environmental agreement for space debris mitigation among asymmetric nations.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	An international environmental agreement for space debris mitigation among asymmetric nations./
Author:	Singer, Michael.
Description:	37 p.
Notes:	Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 50-05, page: 2868.
Contained By:	Masters Abstracts International50-05.
Subject:	Economics, Environmental. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=1508170
ISBN:	9781267262684

An international environmental agreement for space debris mitigation among asymmetric nations.
Singer, Michael.

An international environmental agreement for space debris mitigation among asymmetric nations. - 37 p.

Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 50-05, page: 2868.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of California, Santa Cruz, 2012.

We investigate how ideas from the International Environmental Agreement (IEA) literature can be applied to the problem of space debris mitigation. Space debris pollution is similar to other international environmental problems in that there is a potential for a "tragedy of the commons" effect: individual nations bear all the cost of their mitigation measures but share only a fraction of the benefit. As a consequence, nations have a tendency to underinvest in mitigation. Coalitions of nations, brought together by IEAs, have the potential to lessen the tragedy of the commons effect by pooling the costs and benefits of mitigation. This work brings together two recent modeling advances: (i) a game theoretic model for studying the potential gains from IEA cooperation between nations with asymmetric costs and benefits, (ii) an orbital debris model that gives the societal cost that specific actions, such as failing to deorbit an inactive spacecraft, have on the environment. We combine these two models with empirical launch-share data for a "proof of concept" of an IEA for a single mitigation measure--deorbiting spacecraft at the end of operational lifetime. Simulations of empirically-derived and theoretical launch distributions among nations suggest the possibility that voluntary coalitions can provide significant deorbiting gains relative to nations acting in the absence of an IEA agreement.

ISBN: 9781267262684Subjects--Topical Terms:

1669564
Economics, Environmental.

An international environmental agreement for space debris mitigation among asymmetric nations.
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100 1 $a Singer, Michael. $3 2097197
245 1 3 $a An international environmental agreement for space debris mitigation among asymmetric nations.
300 $a 37 p.
500 $a Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 50-05, page: 2868.
500 $a Adviser: John Musacchio.
502 $a Thesis (M.S.)--University of California, Santa Cruz, 2012.
520 $a We investigate how ideas from the International Environmental Agreement (IEA) literature can be applied to the problem of space debris mitigation. Space debris pollution is similar to other international environmental problems in that there is a potential for a "tragedy of the commons" effect: individual nations bear all the cost of their mitigation measures but share only a fraction of the benefit. As a consequence, nations have a tendency to underinvest in mitigation. Coalitions of nations, brought together by IEAs, have the potential to lessen the tragedy of the commons effect by pooling the costs and benefits of mitigation. This work brings together two recent modeling advances: (i) a game theoretic model for studying the potential gains from IEA cooperation between nations with asymmetric costs and benefits, (ii) an orbital debris model that gives the societal cost that specific actions, such as failing to deorbit an inactive spacecraft, have on the environment. We combine these two models with empirical launch-share data for a "proof of concept" of an IEA for a single mitigation measure--deorbiting spacecraft at the end of operational lifetime. Simulations of empirically-derived and theoretical launch distributions among nations suggest the possibility that voluntary coalitions can provide significant deorbiting gains relative to nations acting in the absence of an IEA agreement.
590 $a School code: 0036.
650 4 $a Economics, Environmental. $3 1669564
650 4 $a Engineering, Aerospace. $3 1018395
650 4 $a Environmental Management. $3 893809
650 4 $a Sustainability. $3 1029978
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710 2 $a University of California, Santa Cruz. $b Technology and Information Management. $3 2097198
773 0 $t Masters Abstracts International $g 50-05.
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791 $a M.S.
792 $a 2012
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=1508170