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Disclosure regulation in the commerc...

Bacelar Fernandes Granja, Joao Pedro.

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Disclosure regulation in the commercial banking industry: Lessons from the National Banking era.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Disclosure regulation in the commercial banking industry: Lessons from the National Banking era./
Author:	Bacelar Fernandes Granja, Joao Pedro.
Description:	67 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-11(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International74-11A(E).
Subject:	Business Administration, Accounting. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3568354
ISBN:	9781303228506

Disclosure regulation in the commercial banking industry: Lessons from the National Banking era.
Bacelar Fernandes Granja, Joao Pedro.

Disclosure regulation in the commercial banking industry: Lessons from the National Banking era. - 67 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-11(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2013.

I exploit temporal and spatial variation in the adoption of disclosure regulation across the state banking systems of the National Banking era to examine how these regulations affect the development and stability of commercial banks. I find strong evidence that requirements to report financial statements in local newspapers promoted the stability and development of the state banking system, but little evidence that periodic on-site examinations incrementally contributed to these outcomes. These results suggest disclosure regulation mitigates agency conflicts between bankers and depositors by facilitating private monitoring. I also analyze the political economy of disclosure regulation using evidence from the popular votes on the 1888 Illinois and Michigan referenda. Counties in which large agricultural landowners and private banks were particularly strong were less likely to vote favorably for the enactment of these laws. These findings suggest incumbent groups oppose laws that promote disclosure and monitoring, because their passage would foster financial development and threaten their private interests.

ISBN: 9781303228506Subjects--Topical Terms:

1020666
Business Administration, Accounting.

Disclosure regulation in the commercial banking industry: Lessons from the National Banking era.
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245 1 0 $a Disclosure regulation in the commercial banking industry: Lessons from the National Banking era.
300 $a 67 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-11(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: Christian Leuz.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 2013.
520 $a I exploit temporal and spatial variation in the adoption of disclosure regulation across the state banking systems of the National Banking era to examine how these regulations affect the development and stability of commercial banks. I find strong evidence that requirements to report financial statements in local newspapers promoted the stability and development of the state banking system, but little evidence that periodic on-site examinations incrementally contributed to these outcomes. These results suggest disclosure regulation mitigates agency conflicts between bankers and depositors by facilitating private monitoring. I also analyze the political economy of disclosure regulation using evidence from the popular votes on the 1888 Illinois and Michigan referenda. Counties in which large agricultural landowners and private banks were particularly strong were less likely to vote favorably for the enactment of these laws. These findings suggest incumbent groups oppose laws that promote disclosure and monitoring, because their passage would foster financial development and threaten their private interests.
590 $a School code: 0330.
650 4 $a Business Administration, Accounting. $3 1020666
650 4 $a Business Administration, Banking. $3 1018458
650 4 $a Economics, History. $3 1017418
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773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 74-11A(E).
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