東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Essays in Mechanism Design.

Pereira de Freitas, Guilherme.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Essays in Mechanism Design.

Record Type:	Language materials, printed : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays in Mechanism Design./
Author:	Pereira de Freitas, Guilherme.
Description:	103 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-10(E), Section: A.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International74-10A(E).
Subject:	Economics, Theory. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3564447
ISBN:	9781303133121

Essays in Mechanism Design.
Pereira de Freitas, Guilherme.

Essays in Mechanism Design. - 103 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-10(E), Section: A.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--California Institute of Technology, 2013.

This dissertation contains three essays on mechanism design. The common goal of these essays is to assist in the solution of different resource allocation problems where asymmetric information creates obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources. In each essay, we present a mechanism that satisfactorily solves the resource allocation problem and study some of its properties. In our first essay, "Combinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences", we present a class of problems akin to time scheduling without a pre-existing time grid, and propose a mechanism that is efficient, strategy-proof and envy-free. Our second essay, "Monitoring Costs and the Management of Common-Pool Resources", studies what can happen to an existing mechanism---the individual tradable quotas (ITQ) mechanism, also known as the cap-and-trade mechanism---when quota enforcement is imperfect and costly. Our third essay, "Vessel Buyback", coauthored with John O. Ledyard, presents an auction design that can be used to buy back excess capital in overcapitalized industries.

ISBN: 9781303133121Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017575
Economics, Theory.

Essays in Mechanism Design.
LDR:01922nam a2200289 4500 001 1958623
005 20140426115053.5
008 150210s2013 ||||||||||||||||| ||eng d
020 $a 9781303133121
035 $a (MiAaPQ)AAI3564447
035 $a AAI3564447
040 $a MiAaPQ $c MiAaPQ
100 1 $a Pereira de Freitas, Guilherme. $3 2093762
245 1 0 $a Essays in Mechanism Design.
300 $a 103 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 74-10(E), Section: A.
500 $a Adviser: John O. Ledyard.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--California Institute of Technology, 2013.
520 $a This dissertation contains three essays on mechanism design. The common goal of these essays is to assist in the solution of different resource allocation problems where asymmetric information creates obstacles to the efficient allocation of resources. In each essay, we present a mechanism that satisfactorily solves the resource allocation problem and study some of its properties. In our first essay, "Combinatorial Assignment under Dichotomous Preferences", we present a class of problems akin to time scheduling without a pre-existing time grid, and propose a mechanism that is efficient, strategy-proof and envy-free. Our second essay, "Monitoring Costs and the Management of Common-Pool Resources", studies what can happen to an existing mechanism---the individual tradable quotas (ITQ) mechanism, also known as the cap-and-trade mechanism---when quota enforcement is imperfect and costly. Our third essay, "Vessel Buyback", coauthored with John O. Ledyard, presents an auction design that can be used to buy back excess capital in overcapitalized industries.
590 $a School code: 0037.
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
650 4 $a Economics, Environmental. $3 1669564
650 4 $a Agriculture, Fisheries and Aquaculture. $3 1020913
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0438
690 $a 0792
710 2 $a California Institute of Technology. $b Social Science. $3 2093732
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 74-10A(E).
790 $a 0037
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2013
793 $a English
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3564447