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The politics of IMF lending

Breen, Michael, (Dr.)

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The politics of IMF lending

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	The politics of IMF lending/ Michael Breen.
Author:	Breen, Michael,
Published:	[Basingstoke] :Palgrave Macmillan, : 2013.,
Description:	1 online resource.
[NT 15003449]:	PART I: THEORY. 2. Who Controls the IMF? -- 3. Domestic Interests and IMF Programs -- 4. The Impact of the Shareholders on IMF Programs -- PART II: EVIDENCE. 5. Testing the Argument -- 6. IMF Lending -- 7. IMF Lending and the Crisis in Europe -- 8. IMF Conditionality -- 9. IMF Conditionality and the Asian Crisis -- PART III: IMPLICATIONS. 10. Theory, Evidence and Reform.
Subject:	Loans, Foreign. -
Online resource:	http://link.springer.com/10.1057/9781137263810
ISBN:	9781137263810 (electronic bk.)

The politics of IMF lending
Breen, Michael,Dr.

The politics of IMF lending[electronic resource] /Michael Breen. - [Basingstoke] :Palgrave Macmillan,2013. - 1 online resource. - International political economy series. - International political economy series..

PART I: THEORY. 2. Who Controls the IMF? -- 3. Domestic Interests and IMF Programs -- 4. The Impact of the Shareholders on IMF Programs -- PART II: EVIDENCE. 5. Testing the Argument -- 6. IMF Lending -- 7. IMF Lending and the Crisis in Europe -- 8. IMF Conditionality -- 9. IMF Conditionality and the Asian Crisis -- PART III: IMPLICATIONS. 10. Theory, Evidence and Reform.

As national governments continue to disagree over how to respond to the aftermath of the global financial crisis, two of the few areas of consensus were the decisions to increase the IMF's capacity to respond and remove the policies designed to limit the use of its resources. Why was this massive increase in the size of the IMF, accompanied by the removal of policies designed to limit moral hazard, such an easy point of consensus? Michael Breen looks at the hidden politics behind IMF lending and proposes a new theory based on shareholder control. To test this theory, he combines statistical analysis with a sweeping account of IMF lending and conditionality during two global crises; the European sovereign debt crisis and the Asian financial crisis.

ISBN: 9781137263810 (electronic bk.)

Source: 629168Palgrave Macmillanhttp://www.palgraveconnect.comSubjects--Corporate Names:

650440
International Monetary Fund.
Subjects--Topical Terms:

695406
Loans, Foreign.
Index Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

LC Class. No.: HG3881.5.I58 / B74 2013

Dewey Class. No.: 332.1/52

The politics of IMF lending
LDR:02219cmm 2200325Ka 4500 001 1894862
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020 $a 9781137263810 (electronic bk.)
020 $a 1137263814 (electronic bk.)
035 $a (OCoLC)857134032
035 $a ocn857134032
035 $a 1894862
037 $a 629168 $b Palgrave Macmillan $n http://www.palgraveconnect.com
040 $a UKPGM $b eng $c UKPGM $d N$T $d IDEBK
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050 4 $a HG3881.5.I58 $b B74 2013
072 7 $a BUS $x 027000 $2 bisacsh
082 0 4 $a 332.1/52 $2 23
100 1 $a Breen, Michael, $c Dr. $3 2004312
245 1 4 $a The politics of IMF lending $h [electronic resource] / $c Michael Breen.
260 $a [Basingstoke] : $b Palgrave Macmillan, $c 2013.
300 $a 1 online resource.
490 1 $a International political economy series
505 0 $a PART I: THEORY. 2. Who Controls the IMF? -- 3. Domestic Interests and IMF Programs -- 4. The Impact of the Shareholders on IMF Programs -- PART II: EVIDENCE. 5. Testing the Argument -- 6. IMF Lending -- 7. IMF Lending and the Crisis in Europe -- 8. IMF Conditionality -- 9. IMF Conditionality and the Asian Crisis -- PART III: IMPLICATIONS. 10. Theory, Evidence and Reform.
520 $a As national governments continue to disagree over how to respond to the aftermath of the global financial crisis, two of the few areas of consensus were the decisions to increase the IMF's capacity to respond and remove the policies designed to limit the use of its resources. Why was this massive increase in the size of the IMF, accompanied by the removal of policies designed to limit moral hazard, such an easy point of consensus? Michael Breen looks at the hidden politics behind IMF lending and proposes a new theory based on shareholder control. To test this theory, he combines statistical analysis with a sweeping account of IMF lending and conditionality during two global crises; the European sovereign debt crisis and the Asian financial crisis.
588 $a Description based on online resource; title from title details screen (Palgrave Connect, viewed Aug. 28, 2013).
610 2 0 $a International Monetary Fund. $3 650440
650 0 $a Loans, Foreign. $3 695406
650 7 $a BUSINESS & ECONOMICS / Finance $2 bisacsh $3 1599209
655 4 $a Electronic books. $2 lcsh $3 542853
830 0 $a International political economy series. $3 1099373
856 4 0 $3 Palgrave Connect $u http://link.springer.com/10.1057/9781137263810
994 $a C0 $b TEF