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Veto power = institutional design in...

Slapin, Jonathan B., (1979-)

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Veto power = institutional design in the European Union /

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Veto power/ Jonathan B. Slapin.
Reminder of title:	institutional design in the European Union /
Author:	Slapin, Jonathan B.,
Published:	Ann Arbor, Mich. :University of Michigan Press, : 2011,
Description:	1 online resource (xii, 184 p.) :ill.
Notes:	Issued as part of UPCC book collections on Project MUSE.
[NT 15003449]:	Institutional design at IGCs -- Case selection -- Modeling institutionalism and intergovernmentalism -- Testing institutionalism and intergovernmentalism -- Winners and losers at Amsterdam -- Council votes and commissioners -- Exit threats, veto rights, and integration -- British accession : exit options and veto power.
Subject:	Legislative veto - European Union countries. -
Online resource:	http://muse.jhu.edu/books/9780472027750/Full text available:
ISBN:	9780472027750 (electronic bk.)

Veto power = institutional design in the European Union /
Slapin, Jonathan B.,1979-

Veto powerinstitutional design in the European Union /[electronic resource] :Jonathan B. Slapin. - Ann Arbor, Mich. :University of Michigan Press,2011 - 1 online resource (xii, 184 p.) :ill. - New comparative politics. - New comparative politics..

Issued as part of UPCC book collections on Project MUSE.

Includes bibliographical references (p. 167-178) and index.

Institutional design at IGCs -- Case selection -- Modeling institutionalism and intergovernmentalism -- Testing institutionalism and intergovernmentalism -- Winners and losers at Amsterdam -- Council votes and commissioners -- Exit threats, veto rights, and integration -- British accession : exit options and veto power.

Veto rights can be a meaningful source of power only when leaving anorganization is extremelyunlikely. For example, small European stateshave periodically wielded their veto privileges to override the preferences of their larger, more economically and militarily powerful neighbors when negotiating European Union treaties, which require the unanimous consent of all EU members. Jonathan B. Slapin traces the historical development of the veto privilege in the EU and how a veto---or veto threat---has been employed in treaty negotiations of the past two decades. As he explains, the importance of veto power in treaty negotiations is one of the features that distinguishes the EU from other international organizations in which exit and expulsion threats play a greater role. At the same time, the prominence of veto power means that bargaining in the EU looks more like bargaining in a federal system. Slapin's findings have significant ramifications for the study of international negotiations, the design of international organizations, and European integration.

ISBN: 9780472027750 (electronic bk.)Subjects--Corporate Names:

587082
European Union.
Subjects--Topical Terms:

1995216
Legislative veto
--European Union countries.Index Terms--Genre/Form:

542853
Electronic books.

LC Class. No.: KJE5307 / .S58 2011

Dewey Class. No.: 341.2422

Veto power = institutional design in the European Union /
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520 $a Veto rights can be a meaningful source of power only when leaving anorganization is extremelyunlikely. For example, small European stateshave periodically wielded their veto privileges to override the preferences of their larger, more economically and militarily powerful neighbors when negotiating European Union treaties, which require the unanimous consent of all EU members. Jonathan B. Slapin traces the historical development of the veto privilege in the EU and how a veto---or veto threat---has been employed in treaty negotiations of the past two decades. As he explains, the importance of veto power in treaty negotiations is one of the features that distinguishes the EU from other international organizations in which exit and expulsion threats play a greater role. At the same time, the prominence of veto power means that bargaining in the EU looks more like bargaining in a federal system. Slapin's findings have significant ramifications for the study of international negotiations, the design of international organizations, and European integration.
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588 $a Description based on print version record.
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