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Tradable permit markets for the cont...

Taylor, Michael A.

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Tradable permit markets for the control of point and nonpoint sources of water pollution: Technology-based v. collective performance-based approaches.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Tradable permit markets for the control of point and nonpoint sources of water pollution: Technology-based v. collective performance-based approaches./
Author:	Taylor, Michael A.
Description:	165 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-10, Section: A, page: 3776.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-10A.
Subject:	Economics, Agricultural. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3109103

Tradable permit markets for the control of point and nonpoint sources of water pollution: Technology-based v. collective performance-based approaches.
Taylor, Michael A.

Tradable permit markets for the control of point and nonpoint sources of water pollution: Technology-based v. collective performance-based approaches. - 165 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-10, Section: A, page: 3776.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2003.

The United States Environmental Protection Agency has begun to encourage innovative market-based approaches to address nonpoint source water pollution. These water quality trading programs have the potential to achieve environmental standards at a lower overall cost. Two fundamental questions must be answered before these benefits can be realized: How will trades between point and nonpoint sources be monitored and enforced? and, How will nonpoint sources be included within a trading market?Subjects--Topical Terms:

626648
Economics, Agricultural.

Tradable permit markets for the control of point and nonpoint sources of water pollution: Technology-based v. collective performance-based approaches.
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100 1 $a Taylor, Michael A. $3 1953275
245 1 0 $a Tradable permit markets for the control of point and nonpoint sources of water pollution: Technology-based v. collective performance-based approaches.
300 $a 165 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-10, Section: A, page: 3776.
500 $a Adviser: Alan Randall.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The Ohio State University, 2003.
520 $a The United States Environmental Protection Agency has begun to encourage innovative market-based approaches to address nonpoint source water pollution. These water quality trading programs have the potential to achieve environmental standards at a lower overall cost. Two fundamental questions must be answered before these benefits can be realized: How will trades between point and nonpoint sources be monitored and enforced? and, How will nonpoint sources be included within a trading market?
520 $a Point-nonpoint source trading can be accommodated through either a technology-based or performance-based approach. The technology-based approach accommodates trading through the use of a proxy for unobservable, individual nonpoint source emission reductions. While trading ratios can effectively deal with the uncertainty associated with using a proxy for actual abatement, they are inefficient and ineffective for dealing with problems of hidden action. The alternative use of performance-based trading approaches requires the use of team contracts that provide individual incentives linked to the performance of the entire group. Such contracts must be designed to overcome both adverse selection and moral hazard problems. Performance-based approaches promise efficiency gains in terms of reducing the problems of asymmetric information, and by introducing flexibility into the choice of nonpoint source abatement technologies and practices.
520 $a Nonpoint sources are exempted from direct regulation under the polluter-pays-principle. As a result, their participation in trading markets is voluntary, thus preventing a baseline cap on pre-trade emissions. To determine whether this arrangement should be changed, we must ask if there something that morally prohibits the direct regulation of nonpoint sources of pollution. While a morally relevant distinction can be made between point and nonpoint sources of emission based on differences in the ability to observe individual emission levels, this relevance is limited to the case of performance-based policy instruments. The moral legitimacy of applying the polluter-pays-principle to nonpoint sources of pollution must be made on a case by case basis, as it is dependent upon existing social, economic, and other practical factors. However, it can be stated that there is no general moral barrier to prohibit the application of the polluter-pays-principle to nonpoint sources of pollution.
590 $a School code: 0168.
650 4 $a Economics, Agricultural. $3 626648
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
650 4 $a Environmental Sciences. $3 676987
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710 2 0 $a The Ohio State University. $3 718944
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 64-10A.
790 1 0 $a Randall, Alan, $e advisor
790 $a 0168
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2003
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3109103