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Essays on political economy and cont...

Carbonell, Oriol.

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Essays on political economy and contract theory.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Essays on political economy and contract theory./
作者:	Carbonell, Oriol.
面頁冊數:	121 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 63-12, Section: A, page: 4417.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International63-12A.
標題:	Economics, Theory. -
ISBN:	049395693X

Essays on political economy and contract theory.
Carbonell, Oriol.

Essays on political economy and contract theory. - 121 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 63-12, Section: A, page: 4417.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2003.

One of the fundamental problems of the positive theory of income taxation is explaining why the statutory income tax schedules in all industrialized democracies are marginal-rate progressive. While it is commonly believed that this is but a simple consequence of the fact that the number of relatively poor voters exceed that of the richer voters in such societies, putting this contention in a voting equilibrium context proves to be a nontrivial task.

ISBN: 049395693XSubjects--Topical Terms:

1017575
Economics, Theory.

Essays on political economy and contract theory.
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100 1 $a Carbonell, Oriol. $3 1944369
245 1 0 $a Essays on political economy and contract theory.
300 $a 121 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 63-12, Section: A, page: 4417.
500 $a Adviser: Alessandro Lizzeri.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--New York University, 2003.
520 $a One of the fundamental problems of the positive theory of income taxation is explaining why the statutory income tax schedules in all industrialized democracies are marginal-rate progressive. While it is commonly believed that this is but a simple consequence of the fact that the number of relatively poor voters exceed that of the richer voters in such societies, putting this contention in a voting equilibrium context proves to be a nontrivial task.
520 $a The first chapter, which is joint with Esteban Klor, develops a political economy model that is consistent with the said intuition. We present a model of representative democracy with policy motivated candidates. Our main results provide conditions under which a strong Nash equilibrium exists, and a tax schedule with increasing marginal tax rates is implemented in some Nash equilibria and in any strong Nash equilibrium.
520 $a The second chapter, which is joint with Efe Ok, examines the Downsian model in the context of nonlinear taxation and inquires about the possibility of providing a formal argument in support of the aforementioned intuition. We first show existence of mixed strategy equilibria and then ask qualitative questions about the nature of these equilibria. Our positive results show that there are cases where marginal-rate progressive taxes are chosen with probability one by the political parties. Our negative results show that marginal-rate regressive taxes may well win the elections with positive probability.
520 $a The third chapter, joint with Diego ComIn, focuses on a different topic. Dynamic labor contracts with transfer fees are examined. These fees are quitting penalties introduced in labor contracts that prevent workers from changing jobs at no cost. We use a data set from soccer labor contracts to determine the main properties of long term contracts in a world where employers can commit to future payments but workers cannot unless a quitting penalty is made explicit. We consider several scenarios that illustrate how different assumptions shape qualitative features of the contracts and how these features match our observations from the data.
590 $a School code: 0146.
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
650 4 $a Economics, Labor. $3 1019135
690 $a 0511
690 $a 0510
710 2 0 $a New York University. $3 515735
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 63-12A.
790 1 0 $a Lizzeri, Alessandro, $e advisor
790 $a 0146
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2003