東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

Studies of informational asymmetries...

Kim, Jinwoo.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Studies of informational asymmetries in standard auctions.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Studies of informational asymmetries in standard auctions./
Author:	Kim, Jinwoo.
Description:	125 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-08, Section: A, page: 3017.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International64-08A.
Subject:	Economics, Theory. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoeng/servlet/advanced?query=3101355

Studies of informational asymmetries in standard auctions.
Kim, Jinwoo.

Studies of informational asymmetries in standard auctions. - 125 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-08, Section: A, page: 3017.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2003.

Chapter 1 studies auctions in which bidders' knowledge about their interdependent valuations is asymmetric, in the sense that there are the <italic>insiders </italic>, who are perfectly informed of their valuations, and the <italic> outsiders</italic>, who only observe one-dimensional signals, thus being partially informed of their valuations. When only one insider and one outsider exist, both English and second-price auctions allocate the good efficiently while a first-price auction fails to do so. With more than two bidders, a second-price auction is no longer efficient in general. By contrast, under plausible conditions, an English auction implements the efficient allocation. I also show that the revenue generated from an English auction increases as more bidders become informed of their valuations. My results apply to a class of auctions in which bidders' valuations consist of common and private value components.Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017575
Economics, Theory.

Studies of informational asymmetries in standard auctions.
LDR:03099nmm 2200277 4500 001 1856554
005 20040701121801.5
008 130614s2003 eng d
035 $a (UnM)AAI3101355
035 $a AAI3101355
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Kim, Jinwoo. $3 1944324
245 1 0 $a Studies of informational asymmetries in standard auctions.
300 $a 125 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-08, Section: A, page: 3017.
500 $a Supervisor: Yeon-Koo Che.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Wisconsin - Madison, 2003.
520 $a Chapter 1 studies auctions in which bidders' knowledge about their interdependent valuations is asymmetric, in the sense that there are the <italic>insiders </italic>, who are perfectly informed of their valuations, and the <italic> outsiders</italic>, who only observe one-dimensional signals, thus being partially informed of their valuations. When only one insider and one outsider exist, both English and second-price auctions allocate the good efficiently while a first-price auction fails to do so. With more than two bidders, a second-price auction is no longer efficient in general. By contrast, under plausible conditions, an English auction implements the efficient allocation. I also show that the revenue generated from an English auction increases as more bidders become informed of their valuations. My results apply to a class of auctions in which bidders' valuations consist of common and private value components.
520 $a Chapter 2 (joint with Yeon-Koo Che) studies how the standard auctions are affected by an asymmetry in bidders' knowledge about rivals' types where a bidder may know the types of some rival bidders but not others. In a second-price auction, the knowledge of rivals' types has no effect, and the good is allocated efficiently. In a first-price auction, bidders' bidding strategies nontrivially depend on rivals' types, yielding an inefficient allocation. The inefficient allocation in the first-price auction is shown to translates into a poor revenue performance. Under a standard regularity condition, the seller's revenue is higher in the second-price auction than in the first-price auction, whereas the bidders are better off in the latter.
520 $a Chapter 3 (joint with James Andreoni and Yeon-Koo Che) experimentally tests a number of hypotheses developed in the second chapter by controlling the amount of information just the way the theoretical model assumes. This experiment aims to test the underlying Nash hypothesis as well. With the risk aversion accounted for, the data from the first-price auction accord well with the hypotheses. Like the existing experiments, the overbidding is prominently observed in the second-price auctions, which appears to result from a motive to hurt the winner's payoff.
590 $a School code: 0262.
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
690 $a 0511
710 2 0 $a The University of Wisconsin - Madison. $3 626640
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 64-08A.
790 1 0 $a Che, Yeon-Koo, $e advisor
790 $a 0262
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2003
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoeng/servlet/advanced?query=3101355