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Price dispersion and retailer behavior.

Zhao, Ying.

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Price dispersion and retailer behavior.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Price dispersion and retailer behavior./
Author:	Zhao, Ying.
Description:	108 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 62-07, Section: A, page: 2489.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3019863
ISBN:	0493312218

Price dispersion and retailer behavior.
Zhao, Ying.

Price dispersion and retailer behavior. - 108 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 62-07, Section: A, page: 2489.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2001.

This dissertation is comprised of three chapters.

ISBN: 0493312218

Price dispersion and retailer behavior.
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008 130614s2001 eng d
020 $a 0493312218
035 $a (UnM)AAI3019863
035 $a AAI3019863
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Zhao, Ying. $3 1043919
245 1 0 $a Price dispersion and retailer behavior.
300 $a 108 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 62-07, Section: A, page: 2489.
500 $a Chair: J. Miguel Villas-Boas.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2001.
520 $a This dissertation is comprised of three chapters.
520 $a In the first chapter, a model of a local ketchup market in a city in Texas that accounts for household, manufacturer, and retailer decisions is constructed. That is, the model develops both the demand and the supply side of the market. The demand side is modeled through a latent utility framework allowing for the ‘no-purchase’ option. Accounting for both sides of the market allows one to check for any endogeneity problems on the demand side. The supply side is modeled through the profit maximizing decisions of both the manufacturers and a multi-product retailer. Accounting for both the retailer and the manufacturer decisions allows one to evaluate the degree of manufacturer competition, the retailer-manufacturers interactions, and the retailer product-category pricing. The results are consistent with a high retailer bargaining power or the existence of two-part tariffs. The results are also consistent with the retailer using category pricing with substitute products that are not in the analysis.
520 $a The second chapter presents an empirical study of economic models of price dispersion due to costly consumer search, competition, and consumer heterogeneity in the context of grocery stores. Three dimensions of price dispersion are studied: price dispersion for a certain brand across stores, price dispersion within a category in a store across brands, and price dispersion over time for a certain brand. A GARCH model is proposed in which price is equal to a mean price plus an error term, and the variance of the error term is a function of past variances as well as a function of competition variables and consumer search. The model is applied to a data set collected by IRI that includes weekly price information from six stores over a period of two years, consumers' purchase history, and demographics. The results of the study show that the categories for which there are greater search costs and more intense competition are the ones for which standardized price dispersion is greater. I also find some support for the impact of consumer heterogeneity on store's price discrimination motivations
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3019863