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Asymmetrical information, suboptimal...

Guo, Peng.

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Asymmetrical information, suboptimal strategies, and institutional performance: The paradox of the 1995 regulations of China's Official Promotion System.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Asymmetrical information, suboptimal strategies, and institutional performance: The paradox of the 1995 regulations of China's Official Promotion System./
Author:	Guo, Peng.
Description:	216 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-05, Section: A, page: 1830.
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3090409

Asymmetrical information, suboptimal strategies, and institutional performance: The paradox of the 1995 regulations of China's Official Promotion System.
Guo, Peng.

Asymmetrical information, suboptimal strategies, and institutional performance: The paradox of the 1995 regulations of China's Official Promotion System. - 216 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-05, Section: A, page: 1830.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University, 2004.

This study investigates ways to improve institutional performance. The research question is how to explain the paradox that the incentive schemes introduced in 1995 in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s Official Promotion System (OPSC)—recommendation voting and promotion criteria linked to local economic performance—achieved results opposite to what was intended.

Asymmetrical information, suboptimal strategies, and institutional performance: The paradox of the 1995 regulations of China's Official Promotion System.
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008 130614s2004 eng d
035 $a (UnM)AAI3090409
035 $a AAI3090409
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Guo, Peng. $3 1940880
245 1 0 $a Asymmetrical information, suboptimal strategies, and institutional performance: The paradox of the 1995 regulations of China's Official Promotion System.
300 $a 216 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 64-05, Section: A, page: 1830.
500 $a Major Professor: Joseph Fewsmith.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Boston University, 2004.
520 $a This study investigates ways to improve institutional performance. The research question is how to explain the paradox that the incentive schemes introduced in 1995 in the Chinese Communist Party (CCP)'s Official Promotion System (OPSC)—recommendation voting and promotion criteria linked to local economic performance—achieved results opposite to what was intended.
520 $a Based on interviews with Chinese local officials in Henan Province, documents in local archives and works produced by local officials, this study evaluates three alternative explanations for this paradox. The first, focusing on individual morality, is the explanation offered by officials of the CCP. The second involves institutional structures. The third draws on the theory of asymmetrical information.
520 $a This study finds that lack of self-discipline among local officials, lack of effective institutional constraints on local officials, and lack of effective solutions to reduce asymmetrical information all contribute to distortions of the 1995 Regulations and help explain the paradox. The findings indicate that when complete transparency is not feasible, suboptimal strategies to fix asymmetrical information need to be employed in order to improve institutional performance.
590 $a School code: 0017
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3090409