東華大學圖書館 |

語系: 繁體中文

說明(常見問題)

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

登入

回首頁

切換: 標籤 | MARC模式 | ISBD

Talking about what does not exist: A...

Hunt, Anne Jude.

FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

Talking about what does not exist: A semantics of radical reference failure.

紀錄類型:	書目-電子資源 : Monograph/item
正題名/作者:	Talking about what does not exist: A semantics of radical reference failure./
作者:	Hunt, Anne Jude.
面頁冊數:	236 p.
附註:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 60-01, Section: A, page: 0154.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International60-01A.
標題:	Philosophy. -
電子資源:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9916338
ISBN:	0599151277

Talking about what does not exist: A semantics of radical reference failure.
Hunt, Anne Jude.

Talking about what does not exist: A semantics of radical reference failure. - 236 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 60-01, Section: A, page: 0154.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Virginia, 1998.

This dissertation claims that non-referring names, commonly thought to have no semantic content, do indeed have such content: sentences containing such names can have determinate truth conditions, conditions guaranteed by the existence of stories of origin attached to paradigmatic such names (fictional names). The discussion begins with a historical overview of the semantics of names, moving from Frege and Russell through recent writers such as Gareth Evans, Nathan Salmon, Mark Richard, and Graeme Forbes. Support for the view that the semantic content of names can be extra-referential comes from the finding that the problem of co-referential names posits the necessity of there being more to semantic content than reference alone. The necessity of the referent as part of the semantic content of a name is addressed in the context of Evans' claim that only the referent can offer proof to communicants that they are speaking of the same thing, when they are. Contra Evans, I find that a story of origin associated with fictional names can also underwrite successful communication, and contra Hilary Putnam, there need not be a causal connection between a referent and any meaningful representation. This opens the path to a development of the conception of the idiosyncratic ontology and an agent's superontology (her set of intentional objects), and a formal presentation of the conditions under which two names are "names of the same thing" even when they fail to refer. It is shown that ontological modeling (developing a conception of what another person thinks there is) is necessary to understanding the conditions under which certain belief attributions are true. Finally, the essay presents a formal semantics for belief attributions and indicative sentences containing fictional and imaginary names.

ISBN: 0599151277Subjects--Topical Terms:

516511
Philosophy.

Talking about what does not exist: A semantics of radical reference failure.
LDR:02616nmm 2200253 4500 001 1850759
005 20051205112320.5
008 130614s1998 eng d
020 $a 0599151277
035 $a (UnM)AAI9916338
035 $a AAI9916338
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Hunt, Anne Jude. $3 1938669
245 1 0 $a Talking about what does not exist: A semantics of radical reference failure.
300 $a 236 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 60-01, Section: A, page: 0154.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Virginia, 1998.
520 $a This dissertation claims that non-referring names, commonly thought to have no semantic content, do indeed have such content: sentences containing such names can have determinate truth conditions, conditions guaranteed by the existence of stories of origin attached to paradigmatic such names (fictional names). The discussion begins with a historical overview of the semantics of names, moving from Frege and Russell through recent writers such as Gareth Evans, Nathan Salmon, Mark Richard, and Graeme Forbes. Support for the view that the semantic content of names can be extra-referential comes from the finding that the problem of co-referential names posits the necessity of there being more to semantic content than reference alone. The necessity of the referent as part of the semantic content of a name is addressed in the context of Evans' claim that only the referent can offer proof to communicants that they are speaking of the same thing, when they are. Contra Evans, I find that a story of origin associated with fictional names can also underwrite successful communication, and contra Hilary Putnam, there need not be a causal connection between a referent and any meaningful representation. This opens the path to a development of the conception of the idiosyncratic ontology and an agent's superontology (her set of intentional objects), and a formal presentation of the conditions under which two names are "names of the same thing" even when they fail to refer. It is shown that ontological modeling (developing a conception of what another person thinks there is) is necessary to understanding the conditions under which certain belief attributions are true. Finally, the essay presents a formal semantics for belief attributions and indicative sentences containing fictional and imaginary names.
590 $a School code: 0246.
650 4 $a Philosophy. $3 516511
650 4 $a Language, General. $3 1018089
690 $a 0422
690 $a 0679
710 2 0 $a University of Virginia. $3 645578
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 60-01A.
790 $a 0246
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 1998
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9916338