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Misaligned interests and commitment ...

Romero Leon, Vidal Fernando.

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Misaligned interests and commitment problems: A study of presidents and their parties with application to the Mexican presidency and privatization in Latin America.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Misaligned interests and commitment problems: A study of presidents and their parties with application to the Mexican presidency and privatization in Latin America./
Author:	Romero Leon, Vidal Fernando.
Description:	162 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-08, Section: A, page: 3081.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-08A.
Subject:	Political Science, General. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3187338
ISBN:	9780542296659

Misaligned interests and commitment problems: A study of presidents and their parties with application to the Mexican presidency and privatization in Latin America.
Romero Leon, Vidal Fernando.

Misaligned interests and commitment problems: A study of presidents and their parties with application to the Mexican presidency and privatization in Latin America. - 162 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-08, Section: A, page: 3081.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2005.

Institutional settings place executives and their parties in a peculiar relation of dependence and confrontation. These two actors need one another to achieve their goals. Nonetheless, the existence of divergent interests and trust problems make collaboration problematic. When and how should we expect presidents to get their parties' support to modify the status quo?

ISBN: 9780542296659Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017391
Political Science, General.

Misaligned interests and commitment problems: A study of presidents and their parties with application to the Mexican presidency and privatization in Latin America.
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035 $a (UnM)AAI3187338
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040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Romero Leon, Vidal Fernando. $3 1916866
245 1 0 $a Misaligned interests and commitment problems: A study of presidents and their parties with application to the Mexican presidency and privatization in Latin America.
300 $a 162 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-08, Section: A, page: 3081.
500 $a Adviser: David D. Laitin.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Stanford University, 2005.
520 $a Institutional settings place executives and their parties in a peculiar relation of dependence and confrontation. These two actors need one another to achieve their goals. Nonetheless, the existence of divergent interests and trust problems make collaboration problematic. When and how should we expect presidents to get their parties' support to modify the status quo?
520 $a To answer this question, I develop a non-cooperative game theoretic framework that explains the circumstances under which presidents are able to get their parties' support in-and-out of Congress. There are three different equilibriums in the game. First, in the collaboration equilibrium, the party supports its president and the president reciprocates. This will happen if the party's costs of supporting its executive can be compensated by the spoils from office and/or presidential coattails and the president can credibly commit to repay his party. The second outcome is the party-as-hostage equilibrium. In this case, the party helps its president because the expected presidential coattails are big enough; although, the party cannot credibly threaten its president if he does not repay. The third, and last, result is the non-collaboration equilibrium. It occurs when the party has insufficient means to control its president and the expected coattails are lower than the costs of supporting the executive; or when the costs of supporting its executive are so high that the party cannot be compensated by the sum of expected presidential coattails and spoils from office.
520 $a To test my game theoretical model, I develop two applications. I first study privatization in Latin America from the mid-1980s and 1990s in united government settings. Using statistical analysis, I find that presidents were able to privatize because they compensated their parties' support and incorporated their parties concerns into the privatization policy. The second application develops an analytical narrative on the Mexican presidency from 1982 to 2000, the last years of the PRI regime. I argue that the current view of Mexican presidents as all-powerful is exaggerated. Instead, PRI's support of its presidents was the result of mutually beneficial exchange enforced through a tight control of this party over its presidents.
590 $a School code: 0212.
650 4 $a Political Science, General. $3 1017391
650 4 $a History, Latin American. $3 1017580
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710 2 0 $a Stanford University. $3 754827
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 66-08A.
790 1 0 $a Laitin, David D., $e advisor
790 $a 0212
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2005
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3187338