東華大學圖書館 |

Language: English

Help

回圖書館首頁

手機版館藏查詢

Back

Switch To: Labeled | MARC Mode | ISBD

A study of the property rights const...

Iliopoulos, Constantine.

Linked to FindBook

Google Book

Amazon

博客來

A study of the property rights constraints in United States agricultural cooperatives: Theory and evidence.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	A study of the property rights constraints in United States agricultural cooperatives: Theory and evidence./
Author:	Iliopoulos, Constantine.
Description:	286 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 60-04, Section: A, page: 1250.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International60-04A.
Subject:	Economics, Agricultural. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9924892
ISBN:	0599244496

A study of the property rights constraints in United States agricultural cooperatives: Theory and evidence.
Iliopoulos, Constantine.

A study of the property rights constraints in United States agricultural cooperatives: Theory and evidence. - 286 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 60-04, Section: A, page: 1250.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Missouri - Columbia, 1998.

This research addresses the issue of efficient user-owned and controlled organizational design. Using agricultural cooperatives as an example set of user-owned and controlled institutional arrangements, this study examines the degree of residual rights of control and residual claims alignment. Leading organizational scholars suggest an advantage, in the case of a firm, of having as many decision-rights as possible vested with the party receiving the residual returns, because in the process of maximizing individual returns organizational efficiency will generally also be maximized. Until now, scholarly work has concentrated on investor-oriented forms of business organization.

ISBN: 0599244496Subjects--Topical Terms:

626648
Economics, Agricultural.

A study of the property rights constraints in United States agricultural cooperatives: Theory and evidence.
LDR:03403nmm 2200313 4500 001 1819800
005 20061006142512.5
008 130610s1998 eng d
020 $a 0599244496
035 $a (UnM)AAI9924892
035 $a AAI9924892
040 $a UnM $c UnM
100 1 $a Iliopoulos, Constantine. $3 1909064
245 1 2 $a A study of the property rights constraints in United States agricultural cooperatives: Theory and evidence.
300 $a 286 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 60-04, Section: A, page: 1250.
500 $a Adviser: Michael L. Cook.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Missouri - Columbia, 1998.
520 $a This research addresses the issue of efficient user-owned and controlled organizational design. Using agricultural cooperatives as an example set of user-owned and controlled institutional arrangements, this study examines the degree of residual rights of control and residual claims alignment. Leading organizational scholars suggest an advantage, in the case of a firm, of having as many decision-rights as possible vested with the party receiving the residual returns, because in the process of maximizing individual returns organizational efficiency will generally also be maximized. Until now, scholarly work has concentrated on investor-oriented forms of business organization.
520 $a This study explores the applicability of the residual claims-residual control rights-argument to alternative business forms. The strength of the residual claims-residual control rights-criterion related to user-owned firms is examined by applying the Coasian "nexus of contracts" definition of efficiency to agricultural cooperatives in US. From a neo-institutional point of view, this study is concerned with the design of a producer-driven, collective action, business organization---an ex ante contract which assigns residual rights of control and residual claimant rights in an organizational efficiency-maximizing way. In designing such an efficiency-maximizing institutional arrangement, several important questions---related to the property rights structure, stakeholder incentives, and resulting inefficiencies---must be addressed. Answers to these questions are sought by developing a neo-institutional theoretical framework for analyzing and comparing alternative firm ownership structures.
520 $a The impact of the property rights structure on investment incentives facing cooperative stakeholders has been crystallized into three problems: the free rider, the horizon, and the portfolio constraints. The main hypothesis of this research is that cooperative property rights structures significantly affect members' incentives to invest in their organizations. To test this hypothesis, a structural equation model with latent variables is developed and tested against data from a national survey of US agricultural cooperatives. The results strongly support the above postulated hypothesis and have serious implications for cooperative organizational design, economic efficiency and investment decisions, as well as for public policy.
590 $a School code: 0133.
650 4 $a Economics, Agricultural. $3 626648
650 4 $a Economics, Finance. $3 626650
650 4 $a Economics, Theory. $3 1017575
690 $a 0503
690 $a 0508
690 $a 0511
710 2 0 $a University of Missouri - Columbia. $3 1017522
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 60-04A.
790 1 0 $a Cook, Michael L., $e advisor
790 $a 0133
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 1998
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=9924892