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Essays in political economics.

Rainer, Ilia.

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Essays in political economics.

Record Type:	Electronic resources : Monograph/item
Title/Author:	Essays in political economics./
Author:	Rainer, Ilia.
Description:	177 p.
Notes:	Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-05, Section: A, page: 1876.
Contained By:	Dissertation Abstracts International66-05A.
Subject:	Economics, General. -
Online resource:	http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3174018
ISBN:	0542115646

Essays in political economics.
Rainer, Ilia.

Essays in political economics. - 177 p.

Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-05, Section: A, page: 1876.

Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2005.

This dissertation consists of three chapters.

ISBN: 0542115646Subjects--Topical Terms:

1017424
Economics, General.

Essays in political economics.
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100 1 $a Rainer, Ilia. $3 1904332
245 1 0 $a Essays in political economics.
300 $a 177 p.
500 $a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 66-05, Section: A, page: 1876.
500 $a Adviser: Andrei Shleifer.
502 $a Thesis (Ph.D.)--Harvard University, 2005.
520 $a This dissertation consists of three chapters.
520 $a Chapter 1 studies the modern impact of pre-colonial centralization in Africa. Using anthropological data we find that centralized pre-colonial political institutions fostered the provision of public goods such as education, health and infrastructure in colonial and post-colonial Africa. Historical evidence suggests that the main virtue of centralized polities was greater accountability of local chiefs, disciplined by competition for higher office. In a model we show how centralization can expand the political arena and reduce local capture by boosting competition among entrenched local elites. We estimate the model and provide evidence consistent with our view that increased accountability was a major benefit of indigenous centralization in Africa.
520 $a Chapter 2 provides a theoretical analysis of state-society relations. The economic literature on interest groups views the state as an arena within which societal interests compete to shape public policy. We argue instead that it is a key function of the state to actively shape society by organizing some social forces (but not others) into pressure groups. We construct a theoretical framework in which state elites decide which groups to mobilize, bargain with them and use them to effectively implement enacted policies. We show that the state faces two conflicting incentives. To extract more rents through policy mediation, it wants to organize the winners and disorganize the lasers from a given policy. On the other hand, broadening overall political participation allows the state to extort more resources by playing the competing interests against each other. The state's support for unbalanced organizational patterns induces highly redistributive but inefficient policies, whereas its desire for social mobilization is efficiency enhancing.
520 $a Chapter 3 shows that despite the fact that the Americans living in low-unemployment states tend to trust each other more than those residing in high-unemployment regions, there is no evidence of the causal effect of local economic conditions on interpersonal trust. Changes in unemployment rate, speed of employment growth or growth rate of real wages do not seem to affect the degree of trust between people. In contrast, I find strong effect of unemployment rate on confidence in banks and financial institutions. By showing that this relationship is stronger for low-education and low-income individuals I dismiss potential reverse causality story and conclude that higher unemployment causes a decline in confidence in financial institutions and not vice-versa.
590 $a School code: 0084.
650 4 $a Economics, General. $3 1017424
650 4 $a Political Science, General. $3 1017391
650 4 $a Economics, History. $3 1017418
690 $a 0501
690 $a 0615
690 $a 0509
710 2 0 $a Harvard University. $3 528741
773 0 $t Dissertation Abstracts International $g 66-05A.
790 1 0 $a Shleifer, Andrei, $e advisor
790 $a 0084
791 $a Ph.D.
792 $a 2005
856 4 0 $u http://pqdd.sinica.edu.tw/twdaoapp/servlet/advanced?query=3174018